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 ABSTRACT 
This dissertation examines some of the economic issues surrounding patenting by 
smaller life science firms.  In this context patents are viewed as firm assets that have a 
value separate from the patented innovation itself, derived from rents that accrue to the 
monopoly rights granted by the patent.  Patents also have costs associated with their 
acquisition, including legal and patent office fees as well as the time and effort required 
to move them through the process from application to granted status. 
The first essay investigates one facet of the cost of patent acquisition, pendency time.  
Patents which take longer to be granted can place a higher cost on the applicant firm, in 
the form of foregone revenues, as well as on society, as longer pendency slows the rate of 
innovation and creates uncertainty for other innovators.  Much research in this area 
concentrates on the influence of patent characteristics on pendency.  This essay uses a 
more comprehensive model that also includes the experience and interests of three 
stakeholders in the patenting process: applicants, their attorneys, and patent examiners.  I 
find that applicant behavior is a significant factor in longer pendency.  This suggests that 
pendency offers benefits to the applicant, including the aforementioned uncertainty on the 
part of potential competitors and more time to assess the nature and value of the 
invention and tailor the patent to market conditions. 
The second essay turns to the subject of patent value, and examines the relationship 
between academic science and industrial innovation.  Knowledge from academic science 
can be an important input for innovation in the life sciences.  Previous research has 
described the impact of science intensity, defined as the number of scientific references in 
the patent, on patent value  Scientific knowledge is not homogeneous, though, any more 
ix 
 
than are the patents that make use of it.  Variations in quality may have a separate 
influence.  Here I develop a novel measure of the quality of the scientific references in 
granted patents, augmenting previous research mainly concerned with the quantity of 
scientific references.  I find that higher quality science is significantly related to patents 
of greater technological importance and thus overall value. 
The third essay is concerned with how the value of patents changes over the course of 
a technology life cycle.  Previous studies of value and pendency have reached conflicting 
conclusions based on whether technology position was included.  This essay uses patents 
related to polymerase chain reaction technology to trace changes in value and the pace of 
change, as well as other patent characteristics, over a technology cycle.  I find that patent 
value and the pace of technological change both change non-linearly over the cycle.  The 
results suggest that these two factors may interact such that during periods of rapid 
technological change shorter pendency is in the applicant’s interest, while longer 
pendency may be preferred during periods of slower change. 
1 
 
1. TIME TO PATENT AT THE USPTO: THE CASE OF EMERGING 
ENTREPRENEURIAL FIRMS 
 
1.1  Introduction 
A major concern about the current state of the patent system in the US is the backlog
1
 
of patent applications in the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) 
(Chartrand, 2002; Walsh, 2002; Batabyal and Nijkamp, 2008).
2
  For instance, in 1996 the 
total number of pending applications at the USPTO was just over 200,000 while from 
2008 onwards the corresponding figure is consistently above 1.2 million (Mitra-Kahn et 
al., 2013)
3
. Because applications, for the most part, are examined in the order they arrive 
at the USPTO this backlog translates to increasingly lengthier patent examination time 
(Mabey Jr, 2010).  To illustrate, half of the patents granted in 1996 spent approximately 
20 months in pendency while, in sharp contrast, half of the patents granted in 2011 spent 
more than 36 months in pendency (Mitra-Kahn et al., 2013). 
The issue of prolonged pendency times is critical for a number of reasons.  First, 
patents regularly reflect improvements in innovation and technological progress (Acs et 
al., 2002; Igami, 2013a), reveal the use of new production methods and generally 
contribute to economic growth (Gould and Gruben, 1996; Shapiro and Hassett, 2005; 
Blind and Jungmittag, 2008). Accordingly, prolonged pendency times can delay 
                                                 
1
 The definition of the “backlog” term is not consistent across the literature; some refer to it to mean 
the number of applications that have not been examined, others to describe the number of pending 
applications and others to denote excess applications beyond patent office capacity (Mitra-Kahn et al., 
2013). Regardless of definition, the trend of increasingly more applications waiting to be granted/rejected 
remains. 
2
 Ackerman (2011) provides an overview of the actions taken by the USPTO to address the problem. 
3
 A number of explanations have been forward as to the drivers of increased patenting at the USPTO 
and these include changes in patent law and policy (Jaffe, 2000) and  a shift toward more applied R&D 
(Kortum and Lerner, 1999).  
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innovations in reaching the market, discourage the disclosure of new production methods 
that can contribute to follow up work and generally undermine the role of intellectual 
property protection in the economy and hinder economic progress (Mabey Jr, 2010).
4
  
Second, because patent claims are revised during the patent examination process, 
prolonged pendency times can create uncertainty for non-applicant inventors on the types 
of technologies they can use or over the technological space they can be active. Third, 
prolonged pendency times can delay financial proceeds via licensing and other means for 
applicants that cannot reap monopoly profits from the exclusion rights afforded by 
patents (see Gans et al., 2008, for relevant discussions).  
However, applicants may also gain from prolonged pendency times (Eckert and 
Langinier, 2013).  As previously discussed, because pending applications are open to 
revisions they can create uncertainty for non-applicant competitors and discourage them 
from entering a given research field (Popp et al., 2004; Harhoff and Wagner, 2009). 
Further, especially in rapidly evolving high technology industries, applications can allow 
for a better understanding of the competitive landscape and subsequently prompt the 
applicant to tailor the claims of the patent. Along the same lines, applications can provide 
more time for the applicant to estimate the commercial value of the patent and delay 
grant-related fees.  Finally, pending applications may be preferred to granted patents 
because the former appear to carry a stronger signaling value of unobservable firm 
                                                 
4
 For a specific example of a case under which patent delays were detrimental to advances in 
innovation see US patent 4237224 which was granted on December 2 1980 after 6 years of delays 
(Feldman and Yoon, 2012).  This patent referred to the rDNA methods developed by Stanley Cohen of 
Stanford University and Herbert Boyer of the University of California, San Francisco and it is often 
considered as a major building block in the growth of a highly innovative industry, biotechnology 
(Orsenigo, 1989).  Earlier grant could potentially have boosted the pace of growth of biotechnology and the 
associated innovations. 
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quality which induces larger inflows of external capital (Baum and Silverman, 2004; 
Häussler et al., 2009; Hoenen et al., 2014). 
All the above mentioned reasons that could encourage a preference for pending patent 
applications over granted patents are particularly pronounced for emerging firms in high 
technology areas because these types of applicants operate in rapidly evolving fields, face 
intense competition and seek external finance often via signaling.  Against this 
background, in this paper we study the factors that influence the pendency time of 
applications submitted to the USPTO by emerging entrepreneurial firms in perhaps one 
of the most rapidly evolving fields - life sciences.  Our primary goal is to illuminate the 
role of the interests of stakeholders, especially applicants, in influencing the length of 
patent pendency time.  This study takes a step toward resolving the existing uncertainty 
as to whether applicant firms, in particular smaller firms, experience pendency time as an 
obstacle to be overcome or as a tool to be wielded in pursuit of strategic firm goals. 
Previous contributions that have also focused on patent applications submitted by 
emerging high technology firms have documented applicant-induced delays at the 
European Patent Office (Palangkaraya et al., 2008; Henkel and Jell, 2010; Berger et al., 
2012)
5
. However, the fundamental differences between the EU and the US patent system 
(Eckert and Langinier, 2013) imply that these findings may be difficult to extrapolate to 
the US. Specifically for the case of patent pendency, de la Potterie notes (2011, 1756) 
that “different patent system designs might lead to different outcomes in terms of 
backlog...”. On the other hand, studies that have examined US-patents place emphasis on 
                                                 
5
 Other works that have also analyzed the pendency of European patents, without placing their 
attention on firm applicants include Harhoff and Wagner (2009) and Van Zeebroeck (2007). 
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patent-specific characteristics such as the technology cycle which the patented invention 
is embedded without investigating how firm behavior can influence the length of patent 
pendency (Régibeau and Rockett, 2010; Xie and Giles, 2011).
6
 
Delays in the length of time it takes for a patent application to be granted can be 
caused by numerous reasons such as inefficiencies in the patent office, increased 
workload, deliberate actions or inexperience of the applicants, patent examiner behavior 
or the increasing complexity of submitted inventions (Mitra-Kahn et al., 2013).  
Accordingly, in the empirical part of the study we build a number of encompassing 
specifications of both duration and linear models that measure the impact of applicants, 
examiners and patent attorneys while accounting for patent-specific features and yearly 
workload.  To test whether delays originate from applicants we adopt the following main 
strategy: we examine the pendency time of patent applications submitted by the focal 
firms over time and analyze if and how patent pendency changes once these firms acquire 
more experience with the patent system. That is, conditional on previous experience and 
the associated learning curve, persistent lengthy pendency times could indicate a strategic 
choice from the side of the applicant firms to prolong the time it takes to be granted a 
patent.   
For the analysis we rely on a set of more than 15,000 patents that were applied for by 
910 US-based small life-sciences firms from 1971 to 2007.
7
 Life sciences is a rapidly 
                                                 
6
In a related study that also uses US patents, Johnson and Popp  (2003) study the likelihood that a 
patent with a given grant lag will be cited by subsequent patents to reveal that patents that take longer to be 
granted are cited more heavily by later patents. 
 
7
 We stop at applications submitted in 2007 to allow enough time to observe the pendency time for the 
majority of applications. Given the substantial time lag between the application and the grant date of a 
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evolving, highly competitive innovative industry
8
 that  relies on a diverse set of 
knowledge bases (Pisano, 2006; Kolympiris et al., 2014).  Given these characteristics, as 
well as the popularity of patents in life sciences (Fligstein, 1996) we expect the large 
number of emerging firms that are active in the field to fit the profile of firms that may 
have incentives to delay the patent acquisition process. Further, patents and patented 
inventions tend to become increasingly complex in the life sciences, which implies that 
their examination in a comprehensive manner can also become gradually more 
challenging.  It follows that a wide array of factors can come into play for the case in 
question and this feature allows us the opportunity to delineate the impact of each factor 
conditional on remaining influences on patent pendency.   
To source data on emerging innovative firms we construct a dataset that includes all 
life sciences firms that won grants from the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) 
program in the US for the period of analysis. In line with its goal to promote innovation 
(Wessner, 2009), the SBIR program provides awards to innovative small firms; as such 
the types of firms that receive funds appear to be a suitable context for our work.  To 
source the patents of those firms across time and to build a longitudinal dataset we 
employ data provided by commercial vendor Thomson Innovation.  
On top of informing the policy-relevant discussion about the sources of patent delays 
at the USPTO, our focus on small firms is consistent with widespread concerns that the 
US patent system puts small firms at a disadvantage (Kingston, 2001; Jaffe and Lerner, 
                                                                                                                                                 
given patent, using 2007 as the cut-off point of our applications allows us the advantage to study patents 
that have been granted up to early 2012. 
8
 The innovative character of the life sciences industry is not uniformly supported in the literature. For 
a discussion see Hopkins et al. (2007). 
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2004; Lanjouw and Schankerman, 2004b; Bessen and Meurer, 2008).  If deliberate delays 
are found to contribute to lengthier patent pendency that would imply that, at least for the 
case in question, the US patent system is not detrimental to the efforts of small innovative 
firms. 
We proceed with the rest of the paper as follows: In the next section we review the 
literature on the factors that can influence the time length of patent pendency. In sections 
3 and 4 we present our methodology and data. In sections 5 and 6 we present our 
analytical results and robustness checks.  We conclude in section 7.    
1.2  Patent stakeholders and their influence on patent pendency time 
Based on extant literature, on theoretical grounds we expect patent pendency to be 
influenced, primarily, by the main stakeholders that are involved in the patent acquisition 
process.  Specifically, those stakeholders are patent applicants, patent examiners, and the 
attorneys representing the applicant firms. 
Perhaps the most pertinent stakeholder in the patent acquisition process is the 
applicant firm.  The applicant can influence patent pendency time both ex ante and ex 
post submission. In the pre-submission period, applications with claims that clearly 
reflect the inventions and document the previous prior art comprehensively can ease the 
examination of the application and accordingly shorten the patent pendency time (Popp et 
al., 2004). In the post-submission period, applicants interact with patent examiners in 
order to fine tune their application by responding to the examiner requests with regard to 
the patent claims, prior relevant work and the like.  Prompt replies and smooth 
collaboration with the examiner can, again, expedite the patent acquisition process (Popp 
et al., 2004).  Importantly, previous literature has documented that the experience of the 
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applicant can be a decisive factor in shaping the impact of the applicant on patent 
pendency time.  More specifically, experience is relevant in that inexperienced applicants 
may submit poorly completed applications, especially if the attorney is also 
inexperienced (Popp et al., 2004).  On the other hand, experienced applicants tend to 
communicate more with the patent office and reply to queries in a more timely manner 
(Van Zeebroeck, 2007).  Along the same lines, experienced applicants often develop a 
knowledge base that allows them to facilitate the progress of their applications more 
effectively (Harhoff and Wagner, 2009).  While an applicant’s experience is important, 
resource availability can also be instrumental. Firms endowed with richer resources may 
be able to afford additional personnel dedicated to patent matters, which can enable them 
to be more timely and effective in their interactions with the patent office (Hall and 
Ziedonis, 2001).   
Conditional on the level of experience and resource availability, what is largely an 
empirical matter is whether emerging innovative firms show a general tendency to keep 
their applications pending for a long time or whether their strategy favors short patent 
pendency times.  Short pendency times would result in small firms keeping a portfolio of 
granted patents that could grant them monopoly rights promptly.  Accordingly, those 
patents could either signal the largely unobserved quality of the firm to external investors 
(Hsu and Ziedonis, 2013) or/and attract investors that value such patents for the 
discounted rents that the associated monopoly rights can bring about (Cockburn and 
MacGarvie, 2009).  On the other hand, pending applications offer the main advantage of 
being open to revisions.  Revisions, in turn, can create uncertainty for competitors on the 
scope of the protected invention and can allow more time for the firm to understand the 
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competitive landscape and tailor the applications.  Further, applications can potentially 
signal a firm that does not sit idle but rather evolves partly via learning-by-doing and 
fine-tuning processes that often emanate from patent acquisition (Hoenen et al., 2014).   
Such effects could lead to increased investment levels and indeed evidence suggests that 
venture capitalists are more attracted to pending patent applications when compared to 
granted patents (Baum and Silverman, 2004; Häussler et al., 2009; Hoenen et al., 2014). 
By extension, advantages of this kind may make pending applications attractive for small 
firms who generally lack collateral and resources and are keen not only on attracting 
investments but also on discouraging firm entry in their research field.   
Next to the patent applicant, the patent examiner is also an integral part of the patent 
acquisition process.  Examiners determine not only whether an application represents a 
patentable invention, but they also influence its final form by refining the claims of the 
invention, adding or deleting prior relevant art and the like (Lemley and Sampat, 2012; 
Cotropia et al., 2013).  To do so, examiners communicate with the applicants frequently 
and as such the pace they work, how closely they analyze each patent and how up to date 
they are with the relevant developments in their field can exert a significant influence on 
the time length of patent pendency.  Albeit theoretically relevant, the empirical evidence 
on the effects of patent examiners on patent pendency is limited; only Régibeau and 
Rockett (2010) analyze the influence of examiners and report statistically significant joint 
tests for examiner-specific binary variables in their study of patent pendency in the 
USPTO.  On the flip side, previous literature has documented the impact of examiners on 
different aspects of the patent acquisition process and as such it provides indirect support 
for the theoretical expectation that patent examiners matter for time pendency. For 
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instance, Cockburn et al. (2002) stress differences across examiners, among others, in 
their willingness to grant broader patents and in the time it takes to dispose of an 
application. In a similar vein, Lemley and Sampat (2012) report differences across 
examiners in the number of prior art citations they add and in their tendency to judge 
submitted inventions as patentable.  Importantly, Lemley and Sampat (2012) show that, 
similar to the case of patent applicants, previous experience with the patent system 
appears to be a prime determinant in driving the differences among patent examiners.  
For example, more seasoned examiners were found to add fewer citations to the patents 
they approve. 
The last stakeholder in the patent acquisition process that we expect to influence 
patent pendency is patent attorneys.  Patent attorneys guide applicant firms through the 
patenting process from application submission to final granting or rejection. To cope with 
their typically limited relevant experience, emerging innovative firms often hire attorneys 
to handle the patent acquisition process and carry the task of communicating with the 
USPTO. It follows that the competencies, experience and other idiosyncratic 
characteristics of patent attorneys should have an influence on patent pendency. Indeed, 
Régibeau and Rockett (2010) report statistically significant joint tests for binary variables 
representing attorneys in their study of patent pendency in the USPTO. 
Importantly, contrary to applicants, we expect both examiners and attorneys to have 
reduced incentives to delay the patent acquisition process. Examiners at the USPTO 
receive part of their compensation based on the number of applications they process 
(Friebel et al., 2006; Koenen and Peitz, 2011) which then should incentivize them to 
10 
 
process applications faster
9
. With regard to attorneys, as far as we are aware, there is no 
evidence indicating their overall tendency to favor longer or shorter pendency times. 
Nevertheless, it is conceivable that they prefer faster processing so that they free up time 
to allow them to work on other cases. 
1.3 Methods and Procedures 
Consistent with the previous discussion, the empirical part of the present work 
associates the elapsed time between the application date of a given patent and its granting 
date conditional on variables that represent stakeholder-specific attributes (as well as 
controlling for invention-specific factors).  The general form of the model is: 
              ∑     
 
∑     
 
∑     
 
∑    
 
                                                
Where       refers to the pendency time of a given patent submitted by firm applicant 
  in year t, examined by examiner   and legally processed by attorney   (DELAY).     is 
the      row vector that contains sixteen non-constant explanatory variables, which we 
describe later in this section. The summation symbols represent applicant-specific, year-
specific, examiner-specific and attorney-specific binary variables.  
We capture the effects of the three relevant stakeholders (applicants, examiners and 
attorneys) with three sets of variables.  First, following previous work (Cockburn et al., 
2002; Régibeau and Rockett, 2010), we include three binary variables that take the value 
of 1 for each patent that has been applied, legally processed and examined by a given 
                                                 
9
 Examiners are expected to also care about patent quality. Indeed, Cockburn et al. (2002) discovered 
that in the USPTO workload volume was not a factor in later judgments of patent validity.  This is in line 
with the argument that examiners maintain patent quality despite workload. 
11 
 
firm, attorney and examiner
10
 respectively, 0 otherwise.  We use these binary variables to 
capture unobservable or difficult to approximate characteristics of the three main 
stakeholders such as innate ability, work ethics and other factors that can influence the 
time length of patent pendency (Lichtman (2004), for instance, shows how examiners 
vary in the style they work).  Second, to capture the effects of experience and the 
associated learning curve discussed previously, we include in the analysis three 
corresponding variables that measure the number of patents each firm (FNUMPATS) and 
attorney (ANUMPATS) had been granted before the focal patent and the number of 
patents that the examiner of the focal patent had examined previously (ENUMPATS).
11
  
Third, conditional on experience we have argued that a priori, it is not clear whether 
small firms (and their actions) favor longer or shorter pendency times.  To empirically 
examine the issue, we include in the analysis a variable that measures the average 
pendency time of the granted patents of the focal firm in the 5 years preceding the focal 
application (FAVGDELAY).
12
  A positive relationship between the average pendency 
                                                 
10
 In the interest of economy, we created binary variables for the 276 examiners that accounted for 
75% of the patents issued.  Even when including binary variables for all examiners, the results did not 
change materially. Along the same lines, the firm binary variables reflect the 162 firms responsible for 75% 
of the patents in this database and the attorney binary variables identify the 159 attorneys responsible for 
75% of the patents in our data.  The remainder of the examiners, firms, and attorneys received a 0 on all 
applicable binary variables, respectively. 
11
 Note that to construct the previous experience variables we use only the available patents in our 
dataset.  While this experience attribution scheme does not capture the full extent of the experience for 
attorneys and examiners, we opt for using it because it affords us the main advantage that it captures what 
we consider as the most relevant experience; we are analyzing a largely homogeneous set of firms in terms 
of age, innovation potential and scientific field which then implies that the examination process of the 
applications of those firms should also be relatively similar.  Therefore, by employing only the patents of 
the set of firms we study we expect to be capturing the experience of the examiners and the attorneys for 
the types of patents we study. 
12
 To include more observations in the analysis, the variable is defined as a 5 year moving average for 
available observations.  By design, we omit from the analysis the first year a firm was granted a patent.  
Also note that while we specify the relevant time span as 5 years, alternative time lags such as 2,3 and 4 
years yielded similar estimates. 
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variable and the dependent variable in the analysis would indicate persistent lengthy 
pendency times which would be a finding consistent with small firms favoring pending 
patent applications perhaps due to the uncertainty they create for competitors.  For 
comparison purposes, we construct analogous previous patent pendency variables for 
examiners (EAVGDELAY) and attorneys (AAVGDELAY). 
Specifically for the case of applicant firms, resource availability can be a factor 
affecting patent pendency.  Firms with greater resources to devote to the patent 
acquisition process may be able to more effectively align this process with their strategy 
which may favor longer or shorter patent pendency times; for instance, if firm strategy 
encourages shorter patent pendency time a firm with more resources can devote 
additional personnel specifically to the focal patent.  Along the same lines, larger 
research teams may signal a general commitment to R&D and patents, which may 
include specialists devoted to efficiently handling the patenting process. Accordingly, we 
include a variable that indicates the number of inventors listed on the patent application 
(INVENTS). 
To account for the possibility that firm behavior with regard to pendency changes as 
firms mature we add a variable (PATENTAGE) that takes the value of 0 for applications 
submitted at the foundation year of the focal firm, the value of 1 for applications 
submitted when the firm is 1 year old and so on.  Over time changes in the competitive 
landscape and the need to transmit firm quality signals may alter the incentives of firms 
towards the direction of patent pendency and we expect PATENTAGE to account for 
such changes. If the need for signaling and the creation of uncertainty for competitors are 
13 
 
more pronounced when the firm is still emerging, then we would expect early patents to 
have longer pendency times when compared to later patents.   
Given the evidence that patent-specific features also have an impact on patent 
pendency at the USPTO  (Régibeau and Rockett, 2010; Xie and Giles, 2011), we include 
a number of control variables to account for such effects. Because more valuable patents 
can incentivize applicants for faster processing (Harhoff and Wagner, 2009; Régibeau 
and Rockett, 2010),
13
 as time spent in pendency could potentially represent substantial 
lost income, we include two variables that measure the value of a given patent. The first 
patent value indicator we employ is based on the number of times a given patent is cited 
by subsequent patents (forward citations).  The intuition behind the forward citations 
measure is that higher citation levels imply superior scientific significance or 
applicability.  Indeed, a number of studies have consistently shown that forward citations 
correlate strongly with realized market value for a particular patent (Harhoff et al., 1999a; 
Harhoff et al., 2003; Gambardella et al., 2008; Fischer and Leidinger, 2014).  
Nevertheless, more recent patents tend to receive fewer citations largely due to the 
effective time needed before they become visible.  In the same vein, the secular increase 
in the annual number of patents over time implies that very early patents may also tend to 
have fewer citations than more recent patents.  Most patents receive their citations in the 
first few years after issue.  If we look at a patent issued in, say, 1980, there were fewer 
patents of all classes issued in the succeeding five years than there were for a patent 
issued 25 years later, in 2005.  All other things being equal, then, the earlier patent should 
                                                 
13
Both Harhoff and Wagner (2009) and Régibeau and Rockett (2010) account for the technology cycle 
of the invention to be patented and find more valuable patents to move faster. Works that do not account 
for the invention cycle reach opposite conclusions (Johnson and Popp, 2003; Van Zeebroeck, 2007). 
14 
 
have fewer forward citations simply because there were fewer other patents available to 
cite it (Lanjouw and Schankerman, 2004a).  To address those two issues we include a 
variable in the analysis that measures the total number of forward citations for each 
sample patent expressed as a proportion of the average number of citations received by 
all patents granted in the same year (CITECOUNT). 
Following previous literature, the second patent value indicator we employ is the size 
of the patent family to which the patent belongs (Lanjouw et al., 1998; Harhoff and 
Wagner, 2009; Fischer and Leidinger, 2014).  Patents in the same patent family typically 
protect the same (set of) invention(s) in different jurisdictions.  Patents that are part of 
broad patent families are expected to be more valuable as the applicant has chosen to 
accrue additional costs for protection in multiple jurisdictions. Accordingly, for every 
patent in the dataset we include its INPADOC
14
 family size as a proxy of patent value 
(FAMSIZE).  We expect both patent value indicators we employ in the analysis to 
associate with shorter patent pendency times.  
To be able to tease out the impact of patent value on the time length of patent 
pendency we need to account for the originality of a given patent.  This holds mainly 
because more original patents are often not only more valuable but also more complex 
and accordingly they take longer to be granted.  To measure originality we follow 
Harhoff and Wagner (2009) in constructing the originality measure first pioneered by 
                                                 
14
 INPADOC, which stands for International Patent Documentation Center, is a patent information 
database that is maintained by the European Patent Office and contains cross-referenced data on patents 
gathered from national patent offices worldwide. 
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Trajtenberg et al. (1997)
15
 (ORIGINAL).  This index is a Herfindahl-type measure that 
measures the degree of similarity between the area of technology of the focal patent and 
the areas of technology of the patents referenced as prior art.  More original patents tend 
to have a lesser degree of technological overlap with the patent they cite as, by definition, 
they represent more novel inventions.  Formally, the measure is calculated as 
            ∑ (
      
     
)
 
  
   , where patent i references patents from k technology 
classes.  To calculate this index we first converted the primary IPC code of the focal 
patent and all of its referenced patents to the 35 category ISI-OST-INPI classification, 
which more accurately reflects technological relatedness than does the IPC coding system 
(Schmoch, 2008)
 16
.  Each term in the summation, then, is the number of patent 
references belonging to a particular technology class divided by the total number of 
patent references for the focal patent.  The index ranges from 0 for the least original 
patents to 1 for the most original patents.  We expect more original patents to take longer 
to be granted. 
To complement features of the submitted invention that can motivate the applicant to 
seek a prompt process of the application and hence influence patent pendency, there are 
features of the submitted invention that can delay the process as they might increase the 
difficulty of the examination task of the examiner. Towards this end, we include three 
relevant control variables in the analysis.  The first two variables measure the number of 
                                                 
15
 On top of the advantage that the relevance and validity of the index has been shown in previous 
works, the index allows us the opportunity to potentially capture the life cycle of a technology with more 
precision.  This holds primarily because identifying the point in time that a technology starts can be 
prohibitively difficult since even the definition of an innovation cycle is problematic.  
16
 The ISI-OST-INPI system collapses a total of 549 unique four digit IPC codes into 35 technology 
classes.   
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patent (PATREFS) and non-patent (NPRS) references included in the granted patent.  We 
expect patents with longer lists of relevant prior art to take longer to be granted as the 
task of examiners and applicants to discover and document such patent and non-patent 
documents can be time consuming.  The third variable we incorporate in the analysis is 
the number of different four-digit IPC categories assigned to the focal patent as a measure 
of patent scope (SCOPE), which indicates a more complex application (Harhoff et al., 
2003; Gans et al., 2008).  Broader patents may take longer to get granted largely because 
the examiner may need to analyze literature from different, and not necessarily directly 
connected, scientific fields. 
Further, to account for changes in the institutional environment at the patent office, 
such as fluctuations in budgets, manpower, and workload, we add a set of binary 
variables designating the application year of each patent (Popp et al., 2004).  As well, we 
include a binary control variable for patents that list more than one examiner 
(MULTEXAM).  The majority of those cases refer to a new examiner working together 
with an experienced examiner. During their first few years on the job examiners cannot 
approve or deny a patent on their own and a supervisor must review their work (Lemley 
and Sampat, 2012).  This can add to the supervisor’s workload and may impact grant 
delay. Finally, we include a binary variable (CONTINUE) that takes the value of 1 for 
applications that have used continuations, under which applicants ask for a renewed 
examination, often to revise the claims, of an existing application (Hegde et al., 2009). 
Because parts of the renewed applications have already gone through the patent 
acquisition process, we expect continuation applications to be processed faster. 
In sum, we build the following model specification: 
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where the summation symbols represent firm, year, examiner and attorney dummies. 
1.4 Data Sources and Presentation 
The recognition of the role SMEs play in innovation is the basis for the Small 
Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program in the US (Audretsch, 2002; Cooper, 
2003).  The SBIR program began in 1982 and mandates a percentage of federal 
extramural research and development expenditures to be allocated to small business 
firms.  Funding is provided in two phases, followed by commercialization; further 
funding, if any, comes from private sources.  In addition to supporting R&D in SMEs, the 
program has the stated goals of stimulating technological innovation in general and 
increasing the commercialization of innovations resulting from federal R&D programs. 
In line with the general goals of the program, the bulk of SBIR funds are awarded to 
small firms operating in cutting edge research areas such as the life sciences, electronics, 
materials and energy conversion.   If a firm develops a patentable innovation as part of its 
participation in the SBIR program, the federal government retains a royalty-free license 
to that innovation.  However, the government is also barred from disclosing any 
information about SBIR innovations for a period of four years after the end of the 
funding cycle, to give the firm time to initiate a patent application (Cooper, 2003).  Given 
18 
 
all of these features of the SBIR program, it appears to be a fertile data source for our 
analysis since the award winners are typically emerging innovative independent firms. 
To perform our empirical analysis we began by sourcing the patents of the SBIR 
winners from commercial vendor Thompson Innovation by looking up their names in the 
patent database maintained by Thomson Innovation
17
.  For our sample we focused on 
patents granted to firms that received an SBIR award from 1983 to 2007.  This resulted in 
a total sample of 15,505 patents issued to 910 life science firms based on applications 
submitted from 1971 to 2007
18
.  Thomson Innovation provided all the necessary 
information we needed to construct the dependent and independent variables (i.e. filing 
and grant date, number of forward citations, list of patent and non-patent references, 
INPADOC family size, IPC codes for the focal patent and the patents cited by it and the 
like).  
Table 1-1 displays descriptive statistics for the variables included in this study.  The 
average patent pendency time was more than 39 months and the standard deviation for 
the dependent variable was close to 20 months, implying a relatively homogenous 
distribution.  Interestingly, as seen in Figure 1 patent pendency time was relatively stable 
at roughly 28 months for the sample firms for patents issued from 1979 to 2002.  Since
                                                 
17
 To ensure we measure all relevant patents and to cope with potential issues that could arise from 
differences in the way a given firm is reported as the assignee in different patents we tried a number of 
variants in the firm name (e.g. 20/20 Genesystems was coded  as 20/20 Genesystems Inc., 20/20 Gene*, 
20-20 Genesystems and so on). 
 
18
 1673 life sciences firms had received an SBIR award from 1983 to 2007. 910 of those firms were 
granted at least one patent and these are firms we employ for our empirical analysis. Firms with patents 
were slightly larger and older than firms without patents and in general had sourced more funds from the 
SBIR program.   
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Variable 
Number of 
Observations 
Mean 
Std 
Dev 
Median Mode Minimum Maximum 
Dependent 
variable 
Patent pendency time (months) 15505 39.49 19.98 36.00 29 5 268 
Continuous 
variables 
Number of previous patent for firm 15505 77.72 136.85 24.00 0 0 849 
Average pendency over previous five years for firm 14187 40.70 13.91 38.76 37.42 9 268 
Number of previous patent for attorney 15505 77.84 121.38 27.00 0 0 764 
Average pendency over previous five years for attorney 15010 41.60 13.01 40.78 40.78 8 268 
Number of previous patents for examiner 15505 29.38 40.47 15.00 0 0 299 
Average pendency over previous five years for examiner 14839 43.19 16.73 39.27 39.27 10 268 
Number of inventors 15505 3.34 2.39 3.00 2 1 33 
Patent application age (years) 15505 12.93 6.97 8.00 6 0 96 
Number of forward citations, standardized 15505 0.96 2.04 0.00 0 0 77 
Size of patent family 15505 63.21 189.59 17.00 1 0 1516 
Originality index 14675 0.54 0.27 0.60 0 0 1 
Number of IPC categories 15505 3.03 1.88 3.00 2 1 17 
Number of backward patent references 15505 32.79 57.71 13.00 0 0 749 
Number of backward non-patent references 15505 37.09 65.76 17.00 0 0 1441 
Binary 
variables 
Multiple examiners
a
 6226             
Continuation Patents
b
 12471             
Other 
measures,  
not used in 
models 
Firm size, unweighted
c
 910 4.78 3.11 4 2 1 12 
Total patents awarded to firm 910 17.04 48.76 5 1 1 850 
Total patents awarded per year to all firms 15505 469.79 464.97 243 964 1 1301 
Total applications submitted per year by all firms, 2001-
2007 
13713 1959.00 152.99 1928 N/A 1775 2291 
aFor this variable, the number of observations lists the number of patents with multiple examiners 
bFor this variable, the number of observations lists the number of granted patents that were the result of a continuation or divisional application. 
cThis measure is the size of the individual, unique firms represented in our database.  It is not counted or averaged over individual patents.  It is coded as follows: 1=1-4 
employees, 2=5-9 employees, 3=10-14 employees, 4=15-19 employees, 5=20-24 employees, 6=25=49 employees, 7=50-74 employees, 8=75-99 employees, 9=100-149 
employees, 10=150-249 employees, 11=250=499 employees, 12=500 or more employees. 
Table 1-1. Descriptive Statistics
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2002, the average pendency time increases consistently across years and reaches its 
maximum for patents issued in 2011, which were applied for more than 70 months 
earlier.  Another noteworthy observation in Table 1-1 is the average pendency time of 
patents from the same firm in the previous 5 years.  The mean value for that variable was 
approximately one month higher than the pendency time of the focal patent.  Similar 
conclusions arise for examiners and attorneys that appear to handle applications at 
comparable time to the focal patent. The persistent lengthy patent pendency times for the 
patent acquisition stakeholders could be explained by the complexity of the patents at 
hand; the average patent had 63 patents in its patent family, was assigned to more than 3 
IPC codes and had more than 32 and 37 patent and non-patent references respectively.  
With regard to originality, most patents had an index value of 0.54 (with 1 denoting the 
most original patent) and the median value was 0.60.  More than 3 inventors were listed 
in each patent and each patent was, on average, cited by one other patent. Echoing the 
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 Figure 1-1. Average Pendency Time 
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findings of Hegde et al. (2009) that patent continuations are more common for high 
technology firms, more than 80 percent of the sample patents were continuations.  
With regard to experience, the average number of previously granted patents for the 
focal firm was 78.  Note, however, that this 78 figure is somewhat inflated by a small 
number of firms in the sample that had a well above average number of patents; a note 
that is further reinforced by the substantially larger standard deviation of the variable 
when compared to the mean observed value. Because these firms are also significantly 
older than remaining firms in the sample, they also inflate the average values of the 
PATENTAGE variable. 
Finally, as seen in Table 1-2 the Pearson correlation coefficients among the variable 
we use in the analysis are relatively weak (the highest value is 0.46). These weak 
correlations should help us tease out separate effects of the regressors in our model.  
1.5  Estimation Results 
Tables 1-3 and 1-4 present the estimates of the specifications described in (1). Table 
1-3 reports the OLS estimates and Table 1-4 presents ML estimates from the Cox 
proportional hazard duration model. The fit statistics of both models, as reported at the 
bottom of each table, indicate that the fitted models have explanatory power. Model 1, 
which includes all the sets of binary variables previously described, is the baseline model.  
However, the multicollinearity condition index of that model surpasses the generally 
regarded as safe value of 30, even though it is still well below the worrisome value of 100 
(Menard, 2002). Accordingly, in models 2 to 7 we present estimates from specifications 
with lower indices that include the binary variables in pairs (e.g. applicant and year 
dummies included and attorney and examiner dummies excluded, applicant and 
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DELAY FNUMPATS FAVGDELAY ANUMPATS AAVGDELAY ENUMPATS EAVGDELAY INVENTS 
FNUMPATS 0.11 1 
      
FAVGDELAY 0.34 -0.08 1 
     
ANUMPATS -0.03 0.15 0.02 1 
    
AAVGDELAY 0.30 0.01 0.40 -0.13 1 
   
ENUMPATS -0.06 0.18 0.03 0.12 0.05 1 
  
EAVGDELAY 0.39 0.05 0.31 0.01 0.19 -0.19 1 
 
INVENTS 0.11 0.05 0.08 0.05 0.08 0.09 0.02 1 
PATENTAGE -0.01 0.19 -0.04 0.00 0.06 0.11 -0.02 0.04 
CITECOUNT -0.02 -0.06 0.04 -0.01 0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.08 
FAMSIZE 0.02 0.18 0.07 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.03 
ORIGINAL 0.08 0.04 0.09 0.06 0.07 0.01 0.05 0.05 
SCOPE 0.12 0.04 0.12 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.13 0.07 
PATREFS 0.16 0.01 0.13 0.07 0.09 0.06 0.03 0.14 
NPRs 0.22 0.04 0.19 0.12 0.12 0.06 0.15 0.10 
MULTEXAM -0.07 -0.02 0.02 -0.02 -0.01 0.17 -0.07 -0.03 
CONTINUE 0.09 0.03 0.12 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.06 0.15 
 
PATENTAGE CITECOUNT FAMSIZE ORIGINAL SCOPE PATREFS NPRs MULTEXAM 
PATENTAGE 1 
       
CITECOUNT -0.07 1 
      
FAMSIZE -0.05 0.08 1 
     
ORIGINAL -0.05 0.07 0.05 1 
    
SCOPE -0.06 0.07 0.20 0.15 1 
   
PATREFS -0.01 0.25 0.08 0.16 0.11 1 
  
NPRs 0.02 0.09 0.13 0.11 0.14 0.46 1 
 
MULTEXAM -0.05 0.02 -0.01 -0.03 -0.02 -0.06 -0.06 1 
CONTINUE 0.06 0.02 0.07 0.06 0.16 0.12 0.13 -0.10 
Table 1-2. Correlation Coefficients
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examiner dummies included and year and attorney dummies excluded and so on). The 
estimated results across specifications are qualitatively similar and suggest that the 
inflated multicollinearity index of Model 1 does not come at any material expense in 
terms of inference.  
While the hazard ratios from the duration models and marginal effects from the OLS 
models are not directly comparable, the estimates of Tables 1-3 and 1-4 agree (a) on the 
direction that each variable moves the time length of patent pendency, (b) on the 
statistical significance of the coefficients and, (c) on the relative magnitude of each 
coefficient when compared with the other coefficients.  All these observations imply that 
our conclusions are not particularly sensitive to the estimation method. As such, in what 
follows we refer mainly to the OLS estimates primarily because of interpretation ease of 
marginal effects. For clarification, in the duration models we study the hazard of an 
application getting granted, hence hazard ratios above 1 correspond to coefficients that 
relate to lengthier patent pendency times. 
The joint significance tests for the applicant, examiner, attorney and year binary 
variables consistently show that these 4 factors have an important role in the time length 
of patent pendency. Specifically for the case of the year dummies, the statistical 
significance of the joint tests indicates that, as expected, workload at USPTO is an 
important factor in shaping patent pendency. Along the same lines, the year binary 
coefficients that correspond to more recent years in the analysis, which are not reported 
in Tables 1-3 and 1-4, were mostly statistically significant, of meaningful magnitude and 
with a positive sign indicating lengthier pendency times.
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Dependent variable is patent pendency time in months. 
Variables   1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
  
Estimate 
 
Estimate 
 
Estimate 
 
Estimate 
 
Estimate 
 
Estimate 
 
Estimate 
Intercept 
 
9.873 *** 
 
11.148 *** 
 
15.221 *** 
 
4.812 *** 
 
12.828 *** 
 
2.319 
  
3.396 * 
Firm NUMPATS 0.076 *** 
 
0.026 *** 
 
0.068 *** 
 
0.019 *** 
 
0.076 *** 
 
0.022 *** 
 
0.065 *** 
Firm AvgDelay 0.235 *** 
 
0.251 *** 
 
0.212 *** 
 
0.237 *** 
 
0.221 *** 
 
0.269 *** 
 
0.248 *** 
Attorney NUMPATS -0.031 *** 
 
-0.005 ** 
 
-0.008 *** 
 
-0.008 *** 
 
-0.031 *** 
 
-0.014 *** 
 
-0.009 *** 
Attorney AvgDelay 0.174 *** 
 
0.161 *** 
 
0.193 *** 
 
0.223 *** 
 
0.168 *** 
 
0.174 *** 
 
0.203 *** 
Examiner NUMPATS -0.045 *** 
 
-0.012 * 
 
-0.047 *** 
 
-0.028 *** 
 
-0.018 *** 
 
-0.018 *** 
 
-0.022 *** 
Examiner AvgDelay 0.224 *** 
 
0.244 *** 
 
0.233 *** 
 
0.243 *** 
 
0.281 *** 
 
0.303 *** 
 
0.284 *** 
INVENTS 
 
0.487 *** 
 
0.538 *** 
 
0.476 *** 
 
0.578 *** 
 
0.394 *** 
 
0.391 *** 
 
0.394 *** 
PATENTAGE -0.367 *** 
 
-0.115 *** 
 
-0.355 *** 
 
-0.119 *** 
 
-0.381 *** 
 
-0.130 *** 
 
-0.332 *** 
CITECOUNT -0.346 ** 
 
-0.385 ** 
 
-0.383 ** 
 
-0.449 *** 
 
-0.276 
  
-0.299 ** 
 
-0.368 ** 
FAMSIZE 
 
0.002 ** 
 
-0.001 
  
0.002 *** 
 
-0.004 *** 
 
0.003 *** 
 
-0.001 
  
0.003 *** 
ORIGINAL 
 
0.295 
  
-0.207 
  
0.304 
  
-0.466 
  
0.457 
  
0.238 
  
0.410 
 
SCOPE 
 
0.225 *** 
 
0.270 *** 
 
0.396 *** 
 
0.189 ** 
 
0.400 *** 
 
0.128 
  
0.193 ** 
PATREFS 
 
0.028 *** 
 
0.029 *** 
 
0.028 *** 
 
0.026 *** 
 
0.024 *** 
 
0.027 *** 
 
0.028 *** 
NPRs 
 
0.017 *** 
 
0.017 *** 
 
0.015 *** 
 
0.020 *** 
 
0.017 *** 
 
0.020 *** 
 
0.019 *** 
MULTEXAM -0.447 
  
-0.285 
  
-0.318 
  
-0.146 
  
0.222 
  
0.373 
  
0.283 
 
CONTINUE -1.774 *** 
 
-1.307 *** 
 
-1.280 *** 
 
-1.144 *** 
 
-1.716 *** 
 
-2.340 *** 
 
-1.705 *** 
Joint 
Significance 
Tests 
Examiner Binaries 1038.6 ***   1140.5 ***   1074.2 ***   1374.0 ***                   
Attorney Binaries 662.6 *** 
 
703.5 *** 
       
715.7 *** 
 
819.3 *** 
   
Firm Binaries 1378.7 *** 
    
1556.9 *** 
    
1772.6 *** 
    
1745.0 *** 
Year Binaries 570.3 *** 
       
718.6 *** 
    
654.0 *** 
 
596.6 *** 
Adjusted R2   0.4330     0.3441     0.3844     0.3551     0.3796     0.3435     0.3840   
Multicollinearity Condition Number 43.719 
  
28.595 
  
29.091 
  
32.883 
  
29.834 
  
33.259 
  
36.701 
 
Number of Observations 12650     12650     12650     12650     12650     12650     12650   
*** .01 significance, ** .05 significance, * .10 significance 
                
Fixed effects included in model only when significance test is noted. 
               
Table 1-3. Results of OLS models with robust SEs
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The coefficient of the previous experience of the applicant firm is positive, indicating 
that firms with more experience have longer patent pendency times.  Specifically, we find 
that on average one additional patent in the past associates roughly with close to two 
additional days (1*0.076*30) in patent pendency. When evaluated at the average value of 
the firm previous experience variable of 78 patents, this finding suggests that the average 
patent in our database was pending for almost 6 months (78*0.076) longer than the 
respective firm’s first patent.  This is a considerable increase whose source can be traced 
back to two main explanations.  Given that we control for unobserved features of the 
applicant firm as well as that the large majority of our firms are in the same size range
19
 
the first explanation is that applicant firms lack a learning curve that will allow them to 
grant their applications faster; the second explanation is that firm strategy favors longer 
patent pendency times.  The lack of a learning curve is difficult to conceptualize for the 
types of firms we study: highly innovative emerging firms.  As such, we consider the 
second explanation as more plausible.  What reinforces our view is the positive sign of 
the Firm AvgDelay variable, which suggests that longer patent pendency times in the past 
correspond to longer patent pendency times for the focal patent as well (and the reverse).  
Importantly, the magnitude of the coefficient is of relevance: when we evaluate the 
estimated 0.235 coefficient of the previous average delay at the average value of the 
variable in question (40.70 months), we estimate that patents whose immediate 
predecessors had average pendency times were pending for an additional 9.5 months
                                                 
19
 We have information on the number of employees at the timing of the receipt of the SBIR grant. 
Most firms had less than 10 employees, the average firm has between 15 and 19 employees and the 
standard deviation of the variable is below its mean value, suggesting thus a relatively homogeneous 
distribution. 
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Dependent variable is patent pendency time in months. 
Variables   1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
  
Hazard Ratio   Hazard Ratio   Hazard Ratio   Hazard Ratio   Hazard Ratio   Hazard Ratio   Hazard Ratio 
Firm NUMPATS 0.995 ***  0.999 
*** 
 0.996 
*** 
 0.999 
*** 
 0.995 
*** 
 0.999 
*** 
 0.996 
*** 
Firm AvgDelay 0.987 ***  0.986 
*** 
 0.988 
*** 
 0.987 
*** 
 0.988 
*** 
 0.986 
*** 
 0.987 
*** 
Attorney NUMPATS 1.003 ***  1.000 
** 
 1.001 
*** 
 1.000 
*** 
 1.002 
*** 
 1.001 
*** 
 1.001 
*** 
Attorney AvgDelay 0.988 ***  0.991 
*** 
 0.987 
*** 
 0.987 
*** 
 0.988 
*** 
 0.990 
*** 
 0.987 
*** 
Examiner NUMPATS 1.003 ***  1.001   1.003 
*** 
 1.003 
*** 
 1.001 
*** 
 1.001 
*** 
 1.001 
*** 
Examiner AvgDelay 0.988 ***  0.988 
*** 
 0.988 
*** 
 0.988 
*** 
 0.984 
*** 
 0.984 
*** 
 0.985 
*** 
INVENTS 
 0.972 
*** 
 0.973 
*** 
 0.974 
*** 
 0.970 
*** 
 0.980 
*** 
 0.982 
*** 
 0.980 
*** 
PATENTAGE 1.024 ***  1.008 
*** 
 1.020 
*** 
 1.009 
*** 
 1.021 
*** 
 1.009 
*** 
 1.021 
*** 
CITECOUNT 1.010 **  1.013 
*** 
 1.010 
** 
 1.021 
*** 
 1.003   1.010 
*** 
 1.008 
** 
FAMSIZE 
 1.000 
*** 
 1.000   1.000 
*** 
 1.000 
*** 
 1.000 
*** 
 1.000   1.000 
*** 
ORIGINAL 
 0.993   1.021   0.975   1.040   0.968   0.981   0.963  
SCOPE 
 0.984 
*** 
 0.980 
*** 
 0.970 
*** 
 0.981 
*** 
 0.970 
*** 
 0.986 
*** 
 0.981 
*** 
PATREFS 
 0.998 
*** 
 0.998 
*** 
 0.998 
*** 
 0.999 
*** 
 0.998 
*** 
 0.999 
*** 
 0.998 
*** 
NPRs 
 0.999 
*** 
 0.999 
*** 
 0.999 
*** 
 0.999 
*** 
 0.999 
*** 
 0.999 
*** 
 0.999 
*** 
MULTEXAM 1.039   1.048 
* 
 1.024   1.028   0.994   0.996   0.996  
CONTINUE 1.115 *** 
 
1.060 ** 
 
1.078 *** 
 
1.058 ** 
 
1.091 *** 
 
1.131 *** 
 
1.100 *** 
Joint 
Significance 
Tests 
Examiner Binaries 951.3 ***   1051.2 ***   980.2 ***   1137.3 ***                   
Attorney Binaries 652.1 *** 
 
804.7 *** 
       
743.8 *** 
 
807.1 *** 
   
Firm Binaries 1340.2 *** 
    
1672.8 *** 
    
1614.1 *** 
    
1578.4 *** 
Year Binaries 407.1 *** 
       
637.3 *** 
    
552.8 *** 
 
429.2 *** 
-2(Log Likelihood) 207472     209363     208571     209502     208752     209803     209074   
AIC 
 
208668 
  
210177 
  
209431 
  
210096 
  
209386 
  
210171 
  
209488 
 
Number of Observations 12650     12650     12650     12650     12650     12650     12650   
*** .01 significance, ** .05 significance, * .10 significance 
                
Fixed effects included in model only when significance test is noted. 
              
Table 1-4: Results of Duration Models 
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(40.70*0.235), compared with patents with no history – the firms’ first patents.  Again, 
because we are accounting for unobserved features of the firm, for previous experience 
and because we analyze firms of similar size, the positive and economically meaningful 
sign of the coefficient in question implies that firm strategy that favors pending patent 
applications is an important component of patent grant delays.     
The coefficients of the previous experience of patent attorneys and examiners 
corroborate the notion that there is a learning curve in the patent acquisition process.  
Both attorneys and examiners process the focal patent faster if their previous experience 
is elevated.  Nevertheless, the relative size of those coefficients suggests that when 
compared to the influence of the applicant, the impact of examiners and attorneys is 
smaller.  That is, attorneys with average previous patent experience decrease the time 
length of patent pendency by 70 days and examiners with average experience by 39 days, 
relative to their initial efforts.
20
 Still, these findings can be informative for the sign of the 
previous experience variable for the applicant firm because it implies that the patent 
acquisition process is subject to a learning curve.  Accordingly, applicant firms can also 
learn to process their applications faster, if this choice is part of their strategy.  The 
previous average delay coefficients for examiners and attorneys indicate that longer 
pendency times in the past correspond to longer pendency time for the focal patent (and 
the reverse). This may be explained by examiners and attorneys matching the pace of the 
patent acquisition process of the applicant firm and relates directly to the note put 
forward by Eckert and Langinier (2013) that within the patent acquisition process “the 
                                                 
20
 Employing the average values of the previous experience variables for attorneys and examiners 
yields  77.84 (patents)*(-0.030)=-2.33 months (70 days) and 29.38 (patents)*(-0.044)=-1.3 months (28 
days). 
28 
 
actions of one type of agent may ‘feed back’ into the behavior of the other agents”.  
Indeed, when evaluated at the average values of the corresponding variables, the effects 
of the previous pendency times of attorneys and examiners are in the same range with the 
effect of the previous pendency time of applicants. As previously discussed, firms with 
average previous patent pendency times keep their patents pending for additional 9.5 
months; the corresponding figures for attorneys and examiners with average previous 
patent pendency time is about 7 and 9.6 months respectively.
21
  Non time-constant 
idiosyncratic factors such as the career stage of a particular examiner or attorney may 
also explain this finding.  
The coefficient of our measure of resource availability, INVENTS, indicates that, 
contrary to expectations, patents with multiple inventors take longer to be granted than 
those with only one inventor.  A potential impetus behind this finding is that patents with 
multiple inventors may not only represent resource endowments, but they can also reflect 
more complex patents (Van Zeebroeck, 2007) that generally have longer patent pendency 
times. 
The coefficient of our first patent value measure, CITECOUNT, is negative and 
statistically significant.  This finding is in line with the results of Harhoff and Wagner 
(2009) and Régibeau and Rockett (2010) that more valuable patents, as indicated by a 
higher number of citations earned from later patents, do in fact experience shorter delays 
in being granted.
22
  These results lend further support to the importance of applicant 
                                                 
21
 0.174*41.60=7.23 and 0.224*43.19=9.67 
22
 The evidence of our second patent value indicator, FAMSIZE, is inconclusive primarily because the 
magnitude of the coefficient is relatively small (for instance the hazard ratio in the duration models is 1) 
which indicates a nearly non-existent meaningful relationship.   
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incentives in influencing the patent process.  The coefficient of the ORIGINAL variable 
is statistically insignificant implying thus that the explanatory power of the originality of 
the invention on patent pendency is limited.
23
  From a policy perspective, the statistical 
insignificance of this variable is good news: USPTO does not appear to need a significant 
amount of time to adapt to and learn to handle highly novel, groundbreaking innovations. 
The three measures we use to capture the complexity of the submitted invention 
strongly corroborate our expectations that more complex patents take longer to be 
granted. The elapsed time between the application and the grant date of patents that 
belong to many IPC codes and have a long list of patent and non-patent references is 
lengthier when compared to remaining patents. What we find particularly interesting is 
that the coefficients of the patent and non-patent references are generally in the same 
range (around 0.028 and 0.017 respectively) with the patent reference coefficient being 
somewhat higher.  Given that, as seen in Table 1-1, the average number of patent and 
non-patent references for the sample firms is close, these findings imply that examiners 
spend comparable time for the two types of references. Nevertheless, because examiners 
are generally more familiar with the patent literature (Popp et al., 2004), the larger 
coefficient of PATREFS can indicate that examiners add more patent references in the 
final form of the submitted invention or/and that they check the patent literature more 
meticulously, which can be a time consuming process.  As well, the control variable that 
takes the value of 1 for cases under which more than one examiner analyzes the focal 
patent is statistically insignificant indicating thus that the variable in question does not 
                                                 
23
 Harhoff and Wagner (2009) also obtained mixed results about the influence of originality. 
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have strong explanatory power for the time length of patent pendency.  Finally, as 
expected, patents that are part of a continuation process are processed faster potentially 
because part of the underlying invention has already been through the patent examination 
process. 
1.6 Robustness Checks 
In order to evaluate the sensitivity of our findings we performed a number of 
robustness checks which we report in Tables 1-5 and 1-6. 
By research design, for our baseline estimates we employ a sample of submitted 
inventions that were eventually granted.  But these submitted inventions may differ 
systematically in unobserved ways from applications that were rejected by the USPTO. 
If, then, these systematic differences affect not only the granting of the patent decision 
but also the time length of patent pendency, then our estimates might suffer from 
selection bias.  To test for this potential bias, in model 1 of Table 1-5 we report estimates 
of a Heckman selection model where in the first stage we model the probability that a 
given application gets granted and in the second stage we analyze the factors that 
influence the time length of patent pendency of the set of applications that were 
granted
24
.  The estimates of the Heckman model suggest that selection bias does not 
                                                 
24
 We limit the observations for this analysis to those applications that were granted after 2001. We do 
so because in 2001 the USPTO began publishing patent applications 18 months after filing. As such, 
rejected applications before 2001 are not available. In particular, out of the 13,713 applications in our 
sample that were submitted after 2001, 5902 were rejected and 7811 applications, which are included in the 
second stage of the Heckman model, were granted patent rights. Also note that the specification in the 
second stage of the Heckman model is not identical to the baseline specification for the following reasons: 
The application data do not include information with regard to the attorneys handling the patent and the 
examiners to which the application was assigned.  Thus, the only binary variables we included were those 
specific to the applicant firm and the application year.  In addition, the vast majority of the applications did 
not have any patent or non-patent backward citations listed, as these are typically furnished later in the 
examination process by means of an Information Disclosure Statement.  We were therefore unable to 
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seriously impact our results. We still conclude that delays in patent pendency relate to the 
complexity of the submitted invention and its value as well as to the experience and, 
potentially, strategy of applicant firms, examiners and attorneys. 
In the baselines estimates of Table 1-3 we employ White’s standard errors in order to 
correct for heteroskedasticity.  In models 2 to 5 of Table 1-5 we present Generalized 
Methods of Moments estimates where we cluster the standard errors at the firm, 
examiner, attorney and year level respectively. We do so to account for the possibility 
that the independence across observations assumption is violated for sample patents of 
the same firm/examiner/attorney/year.  The inference of those estimates is nearly 
identical to the inference of the baseline models
25
 which implies that our models are not 
subject to the potential violation of this assumption.  
In Models 6 to 8 of Table 1-6 we report estimates where the experience and previous 
patent pendency variables for each of the stakeholder we analyze is included separately.  
We perform this exercise to rule out the case that our results are driven by potential 
unobserved underlying relationships between applicants, attorneys and examiners that 
would make delineating the separate impact of each stakeholder a difficult task. The 
similarity, for the largest part, in the magnitude, sign and statistical significance of the 
relevant coefficients implies that our findings are not driven by such potential underlying 
relationships.
                                                                                                                                                 
compute the originality measure (and proxy for the novelty of the application) for the rejected applications 
and include this variable in both stages of the Heckman procedure. Along the same lines, the insignificance 
of the Mill’s ration might be driven by the fact that the selection is affected by unobserved variables. 
Overall, we acknowledge that the Heckman specification is somewhat underspecified but still the results 
we obtains point towards the conclusion that selection bias does not materially hamper our estimates. 
25
 The main difference is the change in the statistical significance of SCOPE in models 2 and 5.   
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1   2   3   4   5 
Model 
Description 
  Heckman model     
GLM, SE 
clustered by 
firm 
  
GLM, SE 
clustered by 
examiner 
  
GLM, SE 
clustered by 
attorney 
  
GLM, SE 
clustered by 
year 
  
First stage - 
Grant 
  
Second stage - 
Pendency        
  
Estimate   Estimate   Estimate 
 
Estimate 
 
Estimate 
 
Estimate 
Intercept 
 
0.035 
  
19.916 
  
9.873 *** 
 
9.873 *** 
 
9.873 *** 
 
9.873 *** 
Firm NUMPATS -0.001 
  
0.006 
  
0.076 *** 
 
0.076 *** 
 
0.076 *** 
 
0.076 *** 
Firm AvgDelay 
   
0.190 *** 
 
0.235 *** 
 
0.235 *** 
 
0.235 *** 
 
0.235 *** 
Attorney NUMPATS 
   
-0.030 *** 
 
-0.031 *** 
 
-0.031 *** 
 
-0.031 ** 
 
-0.031 *** 
Attorney AvgDelay 
   
0.061 *** 
 
0.174 *** 
 
0.174 *** 
 
0.174 *** 
 
0.174 *** 
Examiner NUMPATS 
   
-0.061 *** 
 
-0.045 *** 
 
-0.045 ** 
 
-0.045 *** 
 
-0.045 *** 
Examiner AvgDelay 
   
0.118 *** 
 
0.224 *** 
 
0.224 *** 
 
0.224 *** 
 
0.224 *** 
INVENTS 
 
0.017 *** 
 
0.381 *** 
 
0.487 *** 
 
0.487 *** 
 
0.487 *** 
 
0.487 *** 
PATENTAGE 0.004 ** 
 
-0.060 
  
-0.367 *** 
 
-0.367 *** 
 
-0.367 *** 
 
-0.367 *** 
CITECOUNT 
   
-0.281 *** 
 
-0.346 * 
 
-0.346 ** 
 
-0.346 ** 
 
-0.346 ** 
FAMSIZE 
 
0.000 
  
-0.003 
  
0.002 *** 
 
0.002 ** 
 
0.002 *** 
 
0.002 *** 
ORIGINAL 
    
0.513 
  
0.295 
  
0.295 
  
0.295 
  
0.295 
 
SCOPE 
 
0.039 *** 
 
0.294 
  
0.225 
  
0.225 ** 
 
0.225 * 
 
0.225 
 
PATREFS 
    
0.034 *** 
 
0.028 *** 
 
0.028 *** 
 
0.028 *** 
 
0.028 *** 
NPRs 
    
0.020 *** 
 
0.018 *** 
 
0.018 *** 
 
0.018 *** 
 
0.018 *** 
MULTEXAM 
   
-1.164 ** 
 
-0.447 
  
-0.447 
  
-0.447 
  
-0.447 
 
CONTINUE 
    
-0.949 
  
-1.774 *** 
 
-1.774 *** 
 
-1.774 *** 
 
-1.774 *** 
Joint 
Significance 
Tests 
Examiner Binaries       658.56 ***   855.64 ***   855.64 ***   855.64 ***   855.64 *** 
Attorney Binaries 
   
363.71 *** 
 
588.91 *** 
 
588.91 *** 
 
588.91 *** 
 
588.91 *** 
Firm Binaries 
   
756.49 *** 
 
1368.74 *** 
 
1368.74 *** 
 
1368.74 *** 
 
1368.74 *** 
Year Binaries       414.99 ***   607.67 ***   607.67 ***   607.67 ***   607.67 *** 
Inverse Mills Ratio 
   
0.025 
             
-2(Log Likelihood) 
   
78456 
             
AIC 
    
79329 
             
QIC 
       
13216.0 
  
12953.5 
  
13183.6 
  
13553.6 
 
Adjusted R2 
                  
Multicollinearity Condition Number 6.8042 
  
43.719 
  
43.719 
  
43.719 
  
43.719 
  
43.719 
 
Number of Observations 13255     7353   
 
12650     12650     12650     12650   
*** .01 significance, ** .05 significance, * .10 significance       
           
Table 1-5: Results of Heckman Model and Linear Models with Clustered SEs.
  
 
 
3
3
 
 
    6   7   8   9   10   11   12 
Model 
Description 
  
OLS with 
robust SEs 
  
OLS with 
robust SEs 
  
OLS with 
robust SEs 
  
OLS with 
robust SEs 
  
OLS with 
robust SEs 
  
OLS with 
robust SEs 
  OLS with 
robust SEs; 
firms with < 
200 patents 
              
  
Estimate 
 
Estimate 
 
Estimate 
 
Estimate 
 
Estimate 
 
Estimate 
 
Estimate 
Intercept 
 
18.327 *** 
 
26.548 *** 
 
24.704 *** 
 
36.714 *** 
 
34.769 *** 
 
6.484 *** 
 
-7.077 *** 
Firm NUMPATS 0.080 *** 
       
0.076 *** 
    
0.074 *** 
 
0.148 *** 
Firm AvgDelay 0.332 *** 
             
0.266 *** 
 
0.228 *** 
Attorney NUMPATS 
   
-0.023 *** 
    
-0.035 *** 
    
-0.031 *** 
 
-0.022 *** 
Attorney AvgDelay 
   
0.252 *** 
          
0.192 *** 
 
0.115 *** 
Examiner NUMPATS 
      
-0.030 *** 
 
-0.076 *** 
    
-0.044 *** 
 
-0.054 *** 
Examiner AvgDelay 
      
0.280 *** 
       
0.229 *** 
 
0.195 *** 
INVENTS 
 
0.555 *** 
 
0.672 *** 
 
0.607 *** 
 
0.612 *** 
 
0.688 *** 
    
0.381 *** 
PATENTAGE -0.428 *** 
 
-0.367 *** 
 
-0.329 *** 
 
-0.522 *** 
 
-0.400 *** 
    
0.977 *** 
CITECOUNT -0.422 *** 
 
-0.621 *** 
 
-0.543 *** 
 
-0.516 *** 
 
-0.621 *** 
    
-0.253 
 
FAMSIZE 
 
0.004 *** 
 
-0.001 
  
0.000 
  
0.003 *** 
 
0.000 
     
-0.002 
 
ORIGINAL 
 
0.396 
  
0.794 
  
1.057 ** 
 
1.143 ** 
 
1.148 ** 
    
0.907 
 
SCOPE 
 
0.326 *** 
 
0.282 *** 
 
0.222 ** 
 
0.386 *** 
 
0.334 *** 
    
0.459 *** 
PATREFS 
 
0.026 *** 
 
0.033 *** 
 
0.038 *** 
 
0.031 *** 
 
0.036 *** 
    
0.027 *** 
NPRs 
 
0.025 *** 
 
0.028 *** 
 
0.021 *** 
 
0.030 *** 
 
0.030 *** 
    
0.015 *** 
MULTEXAM -1.773 *** 
 
-1.631 *** 
 
-0.417 
  
-1.731 *** 
 
-1.948 *** 
 
-0.732 ** 
 
-0.309 
 
CONTINUE -1.580 *** 
 
-0.991 ** 
 
-1.088 *** 
 
-0.720 * 
 
-0.739 * 
 
-0.883 ** 
 
-1.892 *** 
Joint 
Significance 
Tests 
Examiner Binaries 1897.2 *** 2203.3 *** 1127.2 *** 2082.7 *** 2315.2 *** 1004.4 *** 801.9 *** 
Attorney Binaries 789.1 *** 635.2 *** 791.2 *** 802.8 *** 865.6 *** 697.1 *** 705.8 *** 
Firm Binaries 1421.3 *** 1154.9 *** 1134.4 *** 1749.4 *** 1321.1 *** 1474.5 *** 1331.6 *** 
Year Binaries 725.0 *** 617.0 *** 576.6 *** 514.0 *** 562.8 *** 577.5 *** 730.2 *** 
Adjusted R2 
 
0.4014 
  
0.3345 
  
0.3578 
  
0.3706 
  
0.3210 
  
0.4104 
  
0.4646 
 
Multicollinearity Condition Number 35.465 
  
33.826 
  
32.663 
  
30.375 
  
27.896 
  
32.410 
  
42.348 
 
Number of Observations 13430     14209     14042     14675     14675     13369     10459   
*** .01 significance, ** .05 significance, * .10 significance 
                
Table 1-6: Results of OLS Models with Robust SEs
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In model 9 of Table 1-6, we omit the lagged dependent variable (and the 
corresponding variables for examiners and attorneys) from the analysis to check whether 
its inclusion biases the results in any material way. The results of model 9 are largely in 
line with the baseline estimates which then indicates that including the lagged dependent 
variable in the model does not come at any significant expense in terms of the robustness 
of our conclusions. 
In models 10 and 11 of Table 1-6 we include the stakeholder-specific and patent-
specific variables of the baseline model separately in the analysis. We do so to check 
whether the stability of our main results is influenced by the inclusion of the control 
(patent-specific) variables in the analysis.  Again, the inference of those two models and 
the inference of the baseline specifications is comparable. 
Finally, in model 12 of Table 1-6 we test the influence of firms with well above 
average production of patents in the dataset; the firms that somewhat inflate the average 
number of patents per firm we report in Table 1-1. Specifically, in model 12 we omit 
from the analysis the observations of the 5 firms in the data with more than 200 granted 
patents. The statistical significance, magnitude and signs of all the coefficients are nearly 
identical to those reported in the baseline models. The most noticeable difference is that 
the magnitude of the firm NUMPATS coefficient increases in size (elevates to 0.148 
from 0.076).      
1.7  Summary and Conclusions 
The overarching contribution of  this paper is to provide novel evidence that strategic 
incentives of emerging entrepreneurial firms contribute significantly to the increasingly 
lengthier time it takes to process a patent application at the USPTO.  Previous relevant 
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literature has attributed such delays mostly to patent-specific features as well as to the 
overall patent system at the US (Mejer and van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, 2011; Xie 
and Giles, 2011).  Here, we reveal that similar to the European case (Palangkaraya et al., 
2008; Henkel and Jell, 2010; Berger et al., 2012) deliberate delays from small firms in 
high technology areas also play an important role in persistent extended patent pendency 
times. 
In particular, we document tenacious lengthy patent pendency times for the small life 
sciences firms we study, a finding that likely arises from the strategic preference of 
entrepreneurial firms for pending patent applications that can increase uncertainty for 
competitors and attract external finance often via a signaling process of unobserved firm 
quality.  For examiners and attorneys, and in line with the sorts of incentives they face, 
we reveal that they seem to experience a learning curve that allows them to process 
applications faster.  However, conditional on this learning curve, previous lengthy/short 
pendency times for examiners and attorneys correspond to lengthy/short pendency times 
for the focal patent.  As well, we document a significant influence of variables that are 
specific to the year of application, which suggests that workload and other year to year 
changes at the USPTO have strong influence on the time length of patent pendency.  
Finally, supporting previous works we find that patent-specific features also play a role in 
patent pendency. 
From a policy perspective, our findings indicate that, for the case in question and 
contrary to widespread concerns, the patent system in the US is not detrimental to the 
performance of small firms.  On the contrary, emerging highly innovative firms appear to 
benefit from it.  This might be both a point of attention and a desired outcome. The 
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concern rests upon the evidence that patents contribute to economic growth and as such 
patent pendency delays can be detrimental from a social welfare perspective. The desired 
outcome relates to the patent system actually working in favor of emerging innovative 
firms in that it allows them to keep their patent applications pending and such pendency 
can improve their early performance at least in terms of discouraging competition and in 
the form of capital attraction. Therefore, our study informs the discussion on the benefits 
and costs of the current state of the patent system in the US.  Along the same lines, the 
finding that patent-specific attributes such as complexity influence the time length of 
patent pendency has a number of implications.  For instance, it suggests that intensive, 
continuously updated training of examiners might be necessary in order to cope with the 
increasing complexity of submitted inventions. Further, incentives for prompt processing 
to examiners that analyze inventions that can a priori be considered as complex might 
also be a fruitful means for shorter patent pendency times. Along the same lines, the 
learning curve that patent examiners seem to experience implies that employee retention 
policies might as well be a worthwhile effort at the USPTO. This is particularly relevant 
given the relative high attrition rate of examiners at the USPTO (de la Potterie, 2011). 
On top of policy implications, new research routes can emanate from our work and 
some of those can address directly the limitations of our approach.  For instance, a 
fruitful avenue would be to extend the research outside the field of life sciences.  As part 
of our research design, we opted on focusing on life sciences largely due to the fact that it 
is an industry that allows us to gain insights on the types of firms that can gain from 
delays in the patent acquisition process.  We expect life sciences patents to have 
commonalities with patents from other high technology fields which then implies 
37 
 
generalizability of our estimates to similar industries. Nevertheless, remaining industries 
with potentially less complex scientific bases may be subject to different patent pendency 
times perhaps because the influence of the factors we have identified is not uniform 
across industries. Along the same lines, richer data could allow for sharper estimates for 
the main stakeholders of patent pendency: applicants, examiner and attorneys.  These 
data are difficult to source and could reflect examiner and attorney specific features such 
as education and career stage. 
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2. DOES QUALITY SCIENCE FOSTER QUALITY INNOVATION? A NEW 
PERSPECTIVE ON ACADEMIC SCIENCE AND PATENT VALUE 
 
2.1  Introduction 
Academics, policy makers and others have systematically analyzed the links between 
academic science and industrial progress and innovation at least since the mid-1900s 
(Bush, 1945). Since then two main strands of literature have emerged.
26
 The first strand 
documents the reliance of industrial innovations on academic research (e.g. Adams, 1990; 
Mansfield, 1991; Mansfield, 1995; Mansfield, 1997; Henderson et al., 1998; Beise and 
Stahl, 1999; Tijssen, 2002; Toole, 2012), while the second provides evidence on how 
academic research has contributed to the birth, industrial organization, spatial 
configuration and sustained growth of knowledge-based industries such as biotechnology 
(e.g. Audretsch and Stephan, 1996; Zucker et al., 1998; O'Shea et al., 2005; Kolympiris et 
al., 2014).
27
  
In this paper we examine yet another potential contribution of academic science on 
innovation ‒ we analyze whether the use of academic science as a source of external 
knowledge by emerging entrepreneurial firms assists these firms in producing more 
valuable innovations.  To form the theoretical expectation for the question at hand we 
reflect upon the nature of academic science.  In particular, academic science in highly 
evolving technological fields such as life sciences often has immediate industrial 
                                                 
26
 Other relevant relatively less developed lines of work include studies on the overlap of academic and 
industrial communities (Breschi and Catalini, 2010; Sauermann and Stephan, 2013), on the technological 
performance of firms that conduct scientific research and publish in academic outlets (Gambardella, 1992; 
Gittelman and Kogut, 2003; Subramanian and Soh, 2010) and on the different types of benefits afforded to 
scientists employed in academia and industry (Stern, 2004; Aghion et al., 2008). 
27
 Schofer et al. (2000) and Shenhav and Kamens (1991) present a skeptical view on the contribution 
of science on economic growth. 
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applications (Narin et al., 1997; Argyres and Liebeskind, 1998) which can be of direct 
relevance to research-based firms.  By extension, academic science should be relevant in 
driving increases in the value of firm innovations in high technology industries.   
Improvements in the value of innovations from utilizing external knowledge are, 
conceivably, of interest to any firm that operates in rapidly evolving industries.  
However, the issue is more pronounced for emerging firms. Such firms typically lack the 
resources, primarily financial, to fully exploit their scientific capabilities and accordingly 
they often rely on knowledge produced by third parties with which, via knowledge 
spillovers, fuel their research efforts (Kolympiris and Kalaitzandonakes, 2013). Indeed, if 
emerging entrepreneurial firms can improve the value of their technology by tapping into 
widely available academic knowledge, then such sources could help them grow at a time 
when opportunities to extend internal knowledge sources are rather limited.  
We measure innovation with patents and we address our research question with a 
number of econometric specifications that link the patent value measures we use (the 
number of times a times a patent is cited by later patents and the size of the patent family) 
with the number of published articles that are cited in the focal patents.  Importantly, the 
vast majority of those articles are not (co)authored by employees of the firm, which 
allows us to measure knowledge spillovers from external sources. Also, in a novel 
empirical exercise, we also account for the quality of those articles in order to test the 
possibility that higher quality academic science leads to higher value of innovations. 
Our choice to measure technological innovation with patents is predicated on the 
evidence that in high technology industries patents are a reliable innovation proxy despite 
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their shortcomings
28
 (Acs et al., 2002; Igami, 2013b).  Importantly, the use of patents as 
our innovation proxy is suitable for the industry we study, life sciences, because of the 
strong links between innovation and patents in that industry (Arundel and Kabla, 1998), 
and because life science firms patent extensively (Fligstein, 1996).  Along the same lines, 
academic research in the life sciences typically has immediate commercial applications 
(Narin et al., 1997; Argyres and Liebeskind, 1998), which implies that academic 
publications can serve as a valuable input for firm-based research with commercial aims 
(McMillan et al., 2000).  Similar to the case of patents, we opt to measure academic 
science with articles published in academic journals largely due to robust findings which 
document that journal articles are a reliable measure of knowledge flows from the public 
sector (Roach and Cohen, 2013).  As well, to account for the quality of the articles in 
question we use a novel measure that reflects the impact factor of the journals in which 
these articles are published. Finally, as previously introduced, to assess the value of 
patents we count the number of times each patent has been cited by later patents (forward 
citations) and we also measure the size of the patent family
29
 to which each patent 
belongs (Lerner, 1994a; Harhoff et al., 1999b; Sneed and Johnson, 2009; Fischer and 
Leidinger, 2014). 
Assessing whether academic science, of varying degrees of quality, as a knowledge 
source and via a knowledge spillover mechanism improves the value of innovations by 
emerging firms is a relatively neglected topic in the literature.  Still, in what is the most 
                                                 
28
 For instance, innovative firms may not patent for strategic reasons (Teece, 1986) or maybe patents 
relate more to invention rather than to innovation (Moser, 2005). 
29
 Patents in the same patent family typically protect the same (set of) invention(s) in different 
jurisdictions. Patents that are then a part of broad patent families are expected to be more valuable as the 
applicant has chosen to accrue additional costs for protection in multiple jurisdictions.   
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related study to our work, Sorenson and Fleming (2004) discovered that patents that 
include non-patent references in their list of prior art references receive more citations by 
later patents.
30
 On top of a number of methodological differences across the two studies 
(i.e. different time frames, measures of publication quality and scope of patent value 
measures), a key distinction is that we focus exclusively on patents of small firms.  This 
affords us the advantage to incorporate firm-specific features in the analysis and, hence, 
understand how these features can influence the relationship in question. From a broader 
perspective, our study contributes to a better understanding of the sources of knowledge 
spillovers; a topic that is of interest to any scholar of economic transactions because 
knowledge spillovers and other forms of knowledge transfers that yield improvements in 
industrial innovation are about as close to a ‘‘free lunch’’ as one gets in economics.  
To complement its academic contributions, our work has timely implications both for 
managers and policy makers. Managers of emerging innovative firms regularly face 
mounting research costs and a general difficulty to financially support their ventures at 
least during the early stages of firm growth.  Accordingly, discovering whether academic 
research can help them improve the value of their innovations can provide them with a 
relatively inexpensive, valuable source of knowledge which in the long run can boost the 
overall performance of the firm.  For university administrators, public granting agencies 
promoting innovation, directors of development policies and directors of technology 
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 Sorenson and Fleming (2004) attribute these findings to the rapid diffusion of knowledge that 
publications (as part of the prior art) bring about. As we explain in detail in section 5.2, while we cannot 
rule out such explanation, it should hold only for the number of forward citations measure of patent value 
of use and not for the patent family measure we employ. With an eye on the evidence linking both 
measures to patent value (Sneed and Johnson, 2009; Fischer and Leidinger, 2014), the fact that we reach 
similar conclusions regardless of the dependent variable we use implies that what we measure is indeed 
patent value. 
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transfer at different universities the study comes at a time when decreasing budgets 
towards academia render the measurement of the economic impact of academic science a 
timely exercise (Lane, 2009; Stephan, 2012). The evidence we provide here can be a 
building block in measuring that impact in a comprehensive manner.   
The rest of the paper is organized as follows:  In section 2 we summarize the 
literature on knowledge transfers and the value of innovations.  Section 3 describes our 
empirical models.  In section 4 we describe our data source, sample development and 
variable construction.  We present our results in section 5, and section 6 concludes. 
2.2  How journal articles can fuel the innovation efforts of emerging firms 
The process of innovation begins, conceptually, with the generation of new 
knowledge in basic research, continues through the act of invention, the embodiment of 
the new knowledge in a new usable form, and culminates in innovation proper, 
developing the invention into a marketable good (Schumpeter, 1942).
31
  All through this 
process knowledge transfers among individuals and organizations and transforms as it 
moves from one stage to the next.  For the case at hand, because a substantial part of new 
knowledge is produced by academic research (OECD, 2013), knowledge transfer 
typically materializes as firms utilize this knowledge to support their innovation efforts.   
Such knowledge transfer is meaningful as a means to improve industrial innovation 
for two main reasons.  First, because firms in knowledge-based industries increasingly 
engage in in-house research and development (R&D) efforts, they are able to absorb, 
understand and eventually utilize external knowledge, including that produced in 
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 This is not to imply that the only route via which innovation takes places is the linear model. Balconi 
et al. (2010) offer an in depth discussion of the linear model, its limitations and merits.  
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academic settings (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989). Second, in the life sciences the lines 
between basic and applied research are somewhat blurry and basic academic research 
often has nearly immediate commercial applications (Narin et al., 1997; Argyres and 
Liebeskind, 1998). Accordingly, knowledge emanating from academic research is not a 
distant island with potential long term usefulness but, rather, it offers a pool which 
industrial players can draw upon to advance their immediate innovative efforts 
(McMillan et al., 2000).  To illustrate, even before the boom in the life sciences industry, 
one out of three medical products and drugs produced from 1986 to 1994 in the US 
would not have been possible had it not been for academic research (Mansfield, 1998).  
Therefore, what becomes clear is that academic science constitutes a valuable knowledge 
source for industrial innovation.  
The next relevant inquiry is how industrial players tap into this knowledge and what 
are the means we expect to be of more value to emerging firms.  In general, personal 
contacts, informal discussions at meetings or conferences, research contracts, consulting 
positions for university faculty as well as labor mobility of skilled research technicians 
and professional networks are some of the most well-known vehicles of knowledge 
transfer between industry and academia (Link and Rees, 1990; Zucker et al., 1998; 
Zucker et al., 2002; D’Este and Patel, 2007).  Note, however, that most of these vehicles 
either entail substantial financial costs before they take place (e.g. hiring university 
employed scientists as consultants) or they materialize primarily after the industrial actor 
has made his mark in the industry (e.g. joining professional networks).  The implication, 
then, is that emerging financially constrained firms are expected to have difficulties in 
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employing those means of knowledge transfer precisely because of their resource scarcity 
and their lack of long-term presence in the industry.  
On the other hand, journal articles appear to be a fruitful means via which emerging 
life science firms can tap into academic knowledge and subsequently improve the value 
of their innovations. Journal subscription costs are nowhere near the costs of, say, hiring 
university-based consultants and often almost identical versions of published articles 
circulate at no cost.  Further, journal articles do not require the presence of the firm in the 
industry for a certain length of time or for the firm to be of a given status before it has 
access to the published material.
32
   To corroborate the argument that the use of journal 
articles can improve the quality of innovation, previous works, not focusing on small firm 
research, have documented that higher science intensity, defined as the number of non-
patent references in a given patent, relates to patents of higher value (Sapsalis and van 
Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, 2007b; Acosta et al., 2012). 
Against this background, we form the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1:  Patents with greater science intensity will be more valuable than 
patents with lesser science intensity. 
While we expect the intensity of journal articles being cited in a patent to have an 
impact on the value of that patent, the quality of those articles and of the knowledge that 
underpins them can also have a separate contributing effect. Some journals publish 
reports of research that is more groundbreaking, better designed, and overall more 
important scientifically.  It follows that academic science published in those journals may 
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 Note, though, that the main disadvantage of academic articles vis-à-vis other forms of knowledge 
transfer is that articles may diffuse information and not knowledge. We account for such an observation in 
the empirical part of our work. 
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represent ideas, techniques and scientific advancements of higher quality that can 
subsequently lead to firm-based innovations of higher quality.
33
  Indeed, within the 
context of knowledge flows between knowledge-based firms in regional clusters, there is 
evidence consistent with the argument that the efficacy of knowledge flows in improving 
firm performance hinges upon the quality of the actors from which knowledge arises 
from (Beaudry and Breschi, 2003; Kolympiris et al., 2011).  By extension, it is 
conceivable that a similar effect is present for the case of knowledge flows from 
academic research to industrial innovation. Following this line of reasoning we form our 
second hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 2: Patents that cite higher quality academic science will be more valuable 
than patents that cite lower quality academic science. 
2.3  Methods and procedures 
To test our hypotheses we relate, via econometric models, the value of patents with 
measures of academic science intensity and quality while controlling for remaining 
factors that can also contribute to patent quality. 
2.3.1 Dependent Variables 
The first dependent variable we employ in the analysis is the number of times a given 
patent is cited by later patents (forward citations).  This variable closely reflects how the 
market values the innovation of the firm.  The intuition behind this measure is that higher 
citation levels imply superior scientific significance or applicability.  Indeed, a number of 
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 Gittelman and Kogut (2003) point out that for firms that engage in academic publishing such activity 
may come at the expense of lowering the quality of commercial innovative efforts. While this appears to be 
a possible scenario for individual firms, it is difficult to extrapolate the finding (and the underlying 
argument) on firms like those we concentrate here that, for the most part, do not engage in publishing but 
employ academic articles to support their innovative output. 
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studies have consistently shown that forward citations correlate strongly with realized 
market value for a particular patent (Harhoff et al., 1999b; Harhoff et al., 2003; 
Gambardella et al., 2008; Fischer and Leidinger, 2014).   
Nevertheless, citation counts are not directly comparable across all patents, since the 
number of citations is partly dependent on the age of the patent.  More recent patents tend 
to have received fewer citations largely due to the effective time needed before they 
become visible.  In the same vein, the secular increase in the annual number of patents 
over time implies that very early patents may also tend to have fewer citations than more 
recent patents.  Most patents receive their citations in the first few years after issue.  If we 
look at a patent issued in, say, 1980, there were fewer patents of all classes issued in the 
succeeding five years than there were for a patent issued 25 years later, in 2005.  All 
other things being equal, then, the earlier patent should have fewer forward citations 
simply because there were fewer other patents available to cite it (Lanjouw and 
Schankerman, 2004a).  To address those two issues we use as our first dependent variable 
the total number of forward citations acquired by each sample patent as a proportion of 
the average number of citations received by all sample patents granted in the same 
calendar year (CITECOUNT)
34
.  Thus for any given year the average patent will have a 
value of 1 on this variable.  A value of 2 indicates that the patent garnered twice the 
average number of forward citations, while a value of 0.5 would indicate it received only 
half the average number, and so forth. 
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 We use the sample patents to calculate CITECOUNT because we expect the patents of the sample 
firms to be comparable and, thus, to have the same prospects in generating a comparable number of 
forward citations. 
We base such expectation on the largely homogeneous set of firms in terms of age, innovation 
potential and scientific field.  
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The second patent value indicator we employ as a dependent variable is the size of 
the patent family to which the patent belongs. Efforts towards innovation/patenting are 
not only uncertain but also, if successful, yield patents/innovations with a wide range of 
values to the firm and to the market in general (Harhoff et al., 1999b; Lanjouw and 
Schankerman, 2004a; Bessen, 2008; Gambardella et al., 2008).  Still, patented 
innovations, when compared with unpatented new products, consistently offer returns to 
firms that exceed the additional cost of obtaining and maintaining patent protection 
(Arora et al., 2008).  This implies that, on average, applicants are able to assess the future 
value of innovations with a reasonable degree of accuracy.  This observation is the basis 
for the dependent variable that reflects the patent family size of the sample patents: 
applicant firms incur additional costs in seeking patent protection in additional 
jurisdictions, so we expect that they would do so only for patents with higher expected 
values.  Accordingly, the variable in question is an indicator that approximates value as 
revealed by the judgment of the applicant firm.  Indeed patent family size is strongly 
related to independent measures of patent value such as the price paid for patents sold in 
auctions  (Lanjouw et al., 1998; Harhoff and Wagner, 2009; Fischer and Leidinger, 
2014).  As such, for our second dependent variable we use the number of other patents in 
each patent’s international family (FAMSIZE), as compiled by INPADOC35.   
2.3.2 Independent Variables 
To test H1 we include in the analysis a variable that measures the number of journal 
articles that are referenced in the focal patent (JARTs). Such choice is congruent with a 
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 INPADOC, which stands for International Patent Documentation Center, is a patent information 
database that is maintained by the European Patent Office and contains cross-referenced data on patents 
gathered from national patent offices worldwide. 
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number of previous studies that have used the number of scientific non-patent references 
as an indicator of the science intensity represented in a patent (Gittelman and Kogut, 
2003; Van Looy et al., 2003; Sapsalis and van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, 2007b; Roach 
and Cohen, 2013).   
To test H2 we construct a novel variable (IMPACT) that reflects the average impact 
rating of the journals in which the articles cited in the focal patent were published.  A 
journal’s impact rating, as calculated by Journal Citation Reports (JCR), is generally 
accepted as a measure of the quality and importance of the research that journal 
publishes.   
2.3.3 Control Variables 
Guided by previous literature, we include a number of control variables that have 
been shown to impact patent value. Reference to prior art in the form of patents is often 
considered an indicator of knowledge flows (Sampat and Ziedonis, 2004; Alcácer and 
Gittelman, 2006; Thompson, 2006; Nemet and Johnson, 2012). Accordingly, we include 
a variable that measures the number of prior art patent references for each patent 
(PATREFS) and expect a positive sign for the associated coefficient.  Along the same 
lines, patents with broader scope of coverage are regarded as more foundational and more 
valuable (Lerner, 1994a; Czarnitzki et al., 2011) although results have been mixed 
(Harhoff et al., 2003).  Following common practice, then, we measure scope as the 
number of distinct four-digit IPC categories assigned to a particular patent (SCOPE). 
In the same vein, patented innovations that are more original and groundbreaking in 
general are often more valuable.  To measure originality we follow Harhoff and Wagner 
(2009) in constructing the originality measure first pioneered by Trajtenberg et al. 
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(1997)
36
 (ORIGINAL).  This index is a Herfindahl-type measure that measures the 
degree of similarity between the area of technology of the focal patent and the areas of 
technology of the patents referenced as prior art.  More original patents tend to have a 
lesser degree of technological overlap with the patent they cite as, by definition, they 
represent more novel inventions.  Formally, the measure is calculated as           
  ∑ (
      
     
)
 
  
   , where patent i references patents from k technology classes.  More 
original patents also tend to occur earlier in the technology cycle (Régibeau and Rockett, 
2010).  To account for such observation, we include a measure of when the patent was 
issued (PATAGE), defined here as the number of months between the month the patent 
was granted and December 2012. 
With regards to firm-specific features we include the number of inventors listed on 
each patent (INVENTS) as a proxy for firm resources devoted to a particular innovation 
and based on the premise that more resources tend to relate to higher value we expect a 
positive sign for the corresponding coefficient.  Other firm characteristics may have an 
impact on patent value as well.  In particular, younger firms may have a structure and 
culture that is more conducive to innovation than older firms that may be more 
bureaucratic (Acs et al., 1994).  On the other hand, older organizations may be more 
innovative due to experience associated with a learning curve or because they are more 
able to capitalize on their research efforts.  To account for such considerations we include 
the age of the firm in years in the year the patent was granted (FIRMAGE).  To account 
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 On top of the advantage that the relevance and validity of the index has been shown in previous 
works, the index allows us the opportunity to potentially capture the life cycle of a technology with more 
precision.  This holds primarily because identifying the point in time that a technology starts can be 
prohibitively difficult since even the definition of an innovation cycle is problematic.  
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for unobservable firm characteristics that may influence patent value (i.e. inherent ability 
of firm researchers or work attitude), we also include a series of binary variables that 
identify the firm listed as the primary applicant on each patent. 
Given the scope of collaborations between universities and industrial actors  (Link 
and Rees, 1990), to account for planned knowledge transfer between the sample firms 
and academic institutions we include a binary variable that takes the value of 1 if a 
university is listed as an co-applicant on the patent document and 0 otherwise 
(COLLAB).  As well, COLLAB also accounts for the possibility that planned knowledge 
transfer can be more effective than journal articles in improving innovation quality 
because the former can entail the transmission of (tacit) knowledge and the latter the 
communication of information.  Theoretically, because university research tends to be 
more basic it can result to more valuable innovations (Czarnitzki et al., 2011).  However, 
firms that engage in publishing can suffer in terms of innovative output (Gittelman and 
Kogut, 2003).  Accordingly, university collaboration can steer the value of firm 
innovation either way and it is difficult to approximate the sign of COLLAB a priori. 
Finally, to account for differences in citation patterns (and patent family size) across 
technology areas, we include a set of binary variables that represent the technology class 
to which the focal patent belongs.  
2.4  Data sources and presentation 
2.4.1 The Small Business Innovation Research Program 
We identified emerging life sciences firms via grant recipients of the Small Business 
Innovation Research (SBIR) program.  In recognition of the role small- and medium-
sized enterprises (SMEs) play in innovation, the US Congress established the SBIR 
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program in 1982 (Audretsch, 2002; Cooper, 2003).  The legislation mandates a 
percentage of federal extramural research and development expenditures be allocated to 
small business firms.  Funding is provided in two phases, followed by commercialization; 
further funding, if any, comes from private investors.  In addition to supporting R&D in 
SMEs, the program has the stated goals of stimulating technological innovation in 
general and increasing the commercialization of innovations resulting from federal R&D 
programs. Pursuant to these goals, the bulk of SBIR funds are awarded to emerging firms 
operating in cutting edge knowledge-intensive research areas such as the life sciences, 
electronics, materials and energy conversion.  Importantly, the majority of the recipients 
are still at their (very) early stages of firm growth and as such the SBIR funds are 
typically the initial financial proceeds from external sources.  Given these features of the 
SBIR program, it appears to be a suitable source of data for the present study; award 
winners are typically emerging, innovative, independent firms with limited financial 
resources
37
.  
2.4.2 Data description 
To develop our data set we began with a list of names of the life science firms that 
had received an SBIR award from 1983 to 2006 provided by InKnowVation.  We then 
searched the patent database maintained by commercial vendor Thompson Innovation
38
 
to identify all patents awarded to these firms based on applications filed from 1971 
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 Note that by concentrating on a relatively homogeneous set of firms allows us the opportunity to 
eliminate sources of patent heterogeneity arising from firm and industry characteristics, such as patent 
portfolio size (Lanjouw and Schankerman, 2004b) and market structure (Ziedonis, 2004). 
38
 To ensure we measure all relevant patents and to cope with potential issues that could arise from 
differences in the way a given firm is reported as the assignee in different patents we tried a number of 
variants in the firm name (e.g. 20/20 Genesystems was coded as 20/20 Genesystems Inc., 20/20 Gene*, 20-
20 Genesystems and so on). 
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through 2007.  This resulted to 15,505 patents awarded to 910 life science firms.
39
 Out of 
this sample for the empirical analysis we employ 8908 patents awarded to 434 life 
science firms.
40
 We opt to use only a portion of the firms and patents in the analysis in 
order to keep the data preparation process tractable and accordingly to ensure the 
reliability of the results without loss of generality. To be specific, the construction of the 
IMPACT variable (used to test H2), which we describe in footnote 16 entailed intensive 
manual labor which required elevated degrees of accuracy and was prone to mistakes. 
Briefly, academic journals are only a part of the list of non-patent literature cited in a 
patent; remaining documents include court documents, industry reports, laboratory 
reference books and gene bank entries. As an automated method of identifying journal 
articles from the list of patent references was not possible,
41
 the process was necessarily 
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 1673 life sciences firms received an SBIR award from 1983 to 2006. 910 of those firms were granted 
at least one patent; these are firms we employ to identify our original sample. Firms with patents were 
slightly larger and older than firms without patents and in general had sourced more funds from the SBIR 
program. We limited our sample to applications submitted up to 2007 in order to minimize potential 
truncation of the data. Given the substantial time lag between application and grant of a given patent, using 
2007 as the cut-off point of our applications allowed us to study patents granted through the end of 2012. 
40
 Firms included in this sample were largely similar to those left out, with the exception of having 
more patents per firm on average (19.3 vs. 10.3) and fewer forward citations per patent on average (9.6 vs. 
13.7). 
41
 The first step in the calculation of IMPACT was to isolate the journal articles from the other non-
patent references, and then extract the journal titles from those references.  Practically, this meant that we 
had to isolate more than 450,000 journal articles out of more than 575,000 entries in the list of cited 
references. This exercise was time consuming and prone to mistakes primarily because these references 
followed no standard format.  This condition was manifested in two practical problems.  First, there was no 
standard order to the elements of the reference and no standard punctuation scheme.  That is, journal 
articles are not reported in the same way at the USPTO not only across patents but also within the same 
patent, and hence in our data source. For instance, sometimes the title was placed between brackets, other 
times it was placed between quotation marks/periods/commas and other times it was not placed between 
any kind of identifiers. Second, across and within patents, journal titles are not reported consistently. To 
illustrate, we came across 311(!) different ways of abbreviating the journal title “Proceedings of the 
National Academy of Sciences of the USA”.  This meant an automated method of associating the journal 
title with its impact rating was prohibitively difficult.  These sorts of reporting inconsistencies limited the 
use of computerized search procedures (VBA coding) and prompted us to use manual cleanups. To limit 
errors from those cleanups, the same individuals performed the cleanups and cross-checked each other’s 
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very manual labor intensive. Accordingly, we chose to process a portion of the data with 
great detail and check for accuracy thoroughly in repeated rounds instead of processing 
the full set of available data, which would come at the expense of data quality.  
Thomson Innovation provided all the necessary information we needed to construct 
the dependent and independent variables (i.e. number of forward citations, list of patent 
and non-patent references, INPADOC family size and the like). Once we isolated the 
journal articles from the full list of non-patent references we developed a list of journal 
titles, tied to each patent, which were then matched to a list of 5451 journal titles and 
their impact ratings from JCR.  From this list, to construct IMPACT, we calculated the 
average impact factor of all the journals in which the articles referenced in each patent 
were published.  We ensured that each journal from each individual reference was 
preserved in the list.  Thus, if a particular patent referenced three different articles 
published in the same journal, that journal would appear three times in the calculation of 
the average impact for that patent. 
To calculate the ORIGINAL index we first converted the primary IPC code of the 
focal patent and all of its referenced patents to the 35 category ISI-OST-INPI 
classification, a classification scheme that more accurately reflects technological 
relatedness than does the IPC coding system (Schmoch, 2008).  Each term in the 
summation, then, is the number of patent references belonging to a particular technology 
class divided by the total number of patent references for the focal patent.
42
  The index 
                                                                                                                                                 
work. As previously stated, to ensure data reliability we chose to manually process with increased precision 
only a portion of the available patents.   
42
 In this sample a total of 549 unique four digit IPC codes were collapsed into 33 technology classes.  
Two technology classes were not represented in this data set. 
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ranges from 0 for the least original patents to 1 for the most original patents. We also 
used the classification scheme which assigned IPCs to technology areas to construct the 
technology class binary variables. 
Table 2-1 displays the descriptive statistics for the variables used in the analysis.  As 
described above, the average patent in any given grant year has a value of one on our first 
dependent variable, CITECOUNT.  Thus by construction this variable has a mean of 1.  
CITECOUNT has a somewhat skewed distribution, as the median is roughly one-third 
the mean and the modal value is zero
43
.  The heterogeneity of the observed values implies 
that our sample is composed of patents of different value.  This observation is further 
reinforced by the wide distribution of the alternative dependent variable, FAMSIZE, 
whose median is also less than one-fourth the mean.  Along the same lines, FAMSIZE 
exhibits considerable over dispersion, in that the standard deviation is nearly three times 
the mean, a characteristic of the data that, as we discuss in the next section, is 
instrumental in the choice of the econometric model we employ for the analysis.   
With regards to the two variables we employ to test our hypotheses the average patent 
in our data set had 32 journal articles in its list of references, with half of the patents 
having fewer than 17 journal articles in their reference list.  Those articles were published 
in journals with an average impact factor of 9.4.  In general the 32 figure we refer above 
strengthens our expectation that the emerging life sciences firms rely on academic 
science as a source of knowledge and it is in line with the note of McMillan et al. (2000)
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 Note that to calculate the variable we employed the number of forward citations of the patents by the 
original 910 firms. Even when the variable is constructed by employing the patents of the 434 sample 
firms, the results remain qualitatively similar. 
  
 
 
5
5
 
 
Variable 
Number of 
Observations 
Mean 
Std 
Dev 
Median Mode Minimum Maximum 
Dependent 
variables 
Year group adjusted number of forward patent citations 8908 1.00 1.98 0.36 0.00 0 29.84 
Size of INPADOC patent family 8908 86.77 241.62 20.00 9.00 0 1516 
Continuous 
variables 
Average impact factor of journal articles cited in firm 
patents (IMPACT) 
8908 9.42 5.49 8.47 5.38 0.23 50.81 
Number of cited journal articles (JARTs) 8908 31.97 38.67 17.00 1.00 1 309 
Number of backward patent references 8908 37.38 61.93 16.00 0.00 0 749 
Number of IPC categories 8908 3.31 2.02 3.00 2.00 1 17 
Originality index 8486 0.57 0.25 0.62 0.00 0 1 
Number of inventors 8908 3.51 2.47 3.00 2.00 1 27 
Age of firm in years at patent application year 8908 12.91 6.06 12.00 10.00 1 51 
Age of patent in months as of December 2012 8908 99.96 51.77 100.00 79.00 0 318 
Binary variable Existence of university collaborator
a
 303             
Other 
Unadjusted number of forward patent citations 8908 15.47 40.68 4.00 0.00 0 904 
Firm size
b
 434 5.11 3.24 4.00 2.00 1.00 12 
a
For this variable, the number of observations lists the number of patents with at least one university as an assignee. 
b
This measure is the size of the individual, unique firms represented in our database. It is coded as follows: 1=1-4 employees, 2=5-9 employees, 3=10-14 
employees, 4=15-19 employees, 5=20-24 employees, 6=25=49 employees, 7=50-74 employees, 8=75-99 employees, 9=100-149 employees, 10=150-249 
employees, 11=250=499 employees, 12=500 or more employees. 
Table 2-1.  Descriptive Statistics
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that biotechnology patents reference basic research more heavily than other areas of 
technology 
The average sample patent had 37 patents in its list of references, belonged to 3 IPC 
categories, had an originality score of 0.57 (out of 1) and had 4 inventors. Finally, only 
303 of the sample patents, from 92 firms, had a university as a co-assignee. 
The correlation coefficients shown in Table 2-2 are, for the most part, relatively 
small
44
, which should help us to estimate the separate effects of each right-hand variable 
on patent value.   
 
citecount famsize impact jarts patrefs scope original collab invents firmage 
famsize 0.06 1 
        
impact 0.01 0.00 1 
       
jarts 0.11 0.10 0.08 1 
      
patrefs 0.29 0.07 -0.05 0.42 1 
     
scope 0.06 0.19 0.09 0.14 0.12 1 
    
original 0.08 0.04 0.01 0.08 0.16 0.14 1 
   
collab -0.03 -0.03 0.05 0.06 -0.03 -0.01 -0.03 1 
  
invents 0.07 -0.01 -0.03 0.08 0.12 0.03 0.05 0.08 1 
 
firmage -0.13 -0.05 -0.05 0.07 0.01 -0.02 0.01 -0.04 0.10 1 
patage 0.04 0.11 0.03 -0.22 -0.26 0.03 -0.09 -0.01 -0.18 -0.47 
Table 2-2.  Correlation Coefficients 
Before we proceed to the empirical results, we need to explicate two important 
considerations that relate to the suitability of the sample at hand and the interpretation of 
the results. 
The first consideration is that the observations from the 434 firms we employ in the 
analysis are relatively similar to the observations from the 910 firms that composed the 
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 The correlations between PATREFS and JARTs (0.42) and between PATAGE and FIRMAGE (-
0.47) are somewhat elevated. In Tables 2-4 and 2-5 we report models for each of the two pairs of variables 
where we include only one of the variables in the analysis.  The estimates from these specifications are 
qualitatively similar to the baselines estimates reported in Table 2-3 and indicate that the two somewhat 
elevated correlation coefficients do not impact our conclusions in any material way. 
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population of life sciences firms that received SBIR grants and patented their research: 
The figures of Table 1-1, which presents the descriptive statistics for the variables we 
employ in the empirical specifications (except IMPACT and JARTs) for the 910 firms, 
and the figures of Table 2-1, which presents the descriptive statistics for the 434 firms, 
exhibit only  small differences
45
.  
The second consideration is that we estimate that approximately 5 to 10 percent of the 
journal articles cited in a given sample patent are (co)authored by employees of the firm 
whose patent cites the journal article. Because of the previously described non-standard 
format that JARTs appear in the patent files we are not able to precisely estimate the 
relevant percentage.  However, when we manually looked up different random lists of 
cited journal articles we found that between 5 and 10 percent of the articles had authors 
affiliated with the firm whose patent cited the article. This low percentage is significant 
for the interpretation of the JARTs and IMPACT coefficients in that it implies that for the 
largest part these coefficients measure knowledge flows from academia to industry 
without the industrial player having produced the cited academic research --- a 
knowledge spillover of sorts.  Relatedly, we maintain that our estimates reflect primarily 
knowledge spillovers even when considering that the prior art listed in patents is added 
both by the applicant firm and by the patent examiner. While examiners do influence the 
list of cited literature in a given patent (Alcácer and Gittelman, 2006; Alcácer et al., 
2009), they do so only at a minimal degree when it comes to non-patent references 
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 To reach the 434 firms we employed the following procedure: Because the unit of analysis in the 
models is the patent, we first randomly selected 7753 patents (half of the population patents – 15505) 
which we manually processed to calculate IMPACT and JARTs. These 7753 patents represented 
approximately 87 percent of the patents owned by 434 firms. We then manually processed the remaining 
1156 patents for those firms to reach the final sample of 434 firms with 8908 patents. 
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(Tijssen, 2002), perhaps because they are less familiar with the academic literature when 
compared to their exposure to patents.
46
  Specifically for life sciences, and without 
separating patent and non-patent references, evidence shows that life sciences is a field 
where the share of cited references that come directly from the inventors is higher than 
the corresponding share in the majority of other fields (Criscuolo and Verspagen, 2008; 
Alcácer et al., 2009).  All in all, such observations are among the prime drivers in 
suggesting that journal articles cited in a given patent are a reliable measure of 
knowledge flows (Roach and Cohen, 2013).  
2.5  Empirical Results 
Table 2-3 presents the empirical estimates for the 4 models we employ to test the 
hypotheses. The dependent variable in Models 1 and 2 is the adjusted number of forward 
citations for a given patent. Because, as a proportion, this variable has a lower bound of 0 
we use a Tobit estimator to address this feature of the data (Wooldridge, 2009). The 
dependent variable in Models 3 and 4 is the size of the patent family. Given the count 
nature of this variable as well as the observed over dispersion, as described in section 4, 
we employ a negative binomial estimator for those models. Models 2 and 4 include an 
interaction term that is the product of IMPACT and JARTs. We include this variable in 
the analysis to test for potential mediating effects between the two variables of interest.  
The multicollinearity condition index reported in Table 2-3 and the fit statistics suggest 
that inference concerns associated with multicollinearity are not pronounced, since in all 
specifications the index is below the threshold level of  30 (Belsley et al., 1980),  and that 
                                                 
46
 A substantial portion of the sample patents were granted before 2001, which is the year after which 
USPTO makes available information about whether a cited reference was added by the examiner or the 
applicant. Accordingly, we cannot check who added the journal article in the list of patent references. 
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the models have explanatory power. To reinforce the small impact of multicollinearity on 
inference, in Tables 2-4 and 2-5 where we omit variables with elevated correlation 
coefficients from the analysis (see footnote 19) and construct models with lower 
condition indices, the results remain similar to the baseline estimates of Table 2-3.  
2.5.1 Value as number of forward citations 
In model 1 of Table 2-3 we fail to reject both H1 and H2.  Both IMPACT and JARTs, 
show positive and statistically significant coefficients.  These results demonstrate that 
science quality and science intensity have independent effects on the value of patented 
innovations.  These results support earlier findings that patents with greater science 
intensity garner more citations and are more valuable (Gittelman and Kogut, 2003; 
Sorenson and Fleming, 2004; Acosta et al., 2012).  The novel findings regarding science 
quality yield insights on the relationship between academic science and industrial 
innovation. Perhaps because industry and academia have distinct structures of work and 
characteristics of practitioners (Sauermann and Stephan, 2013), firms that conduct quality 
research appear to produce subpar innovations in terms of quality (Gittelman and Kogut, 
2003).  However, our results imply that such findings are likely to reflect shortcomings in 
the division of labor within a given firm and to not necessarily reveal the actual value of 
academic research to industrial innovation.  Our findings indicate that higher quality 
science does lead to higher quality innovation, even though the two activities may be 
conducted by different individuals or organizations.  Further illumination on this topic is 
found in the results for the COLLAB variable, which indicates the presence of a 
university as one of the assignees on the patent.  The negative coefficient of COLLAB
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Tobit models.  Dependent variable is year group adjusted 
number of forward patent citations.   
Negative binomial models.  Dependent variable is patent 
family size. 
Variables/Models Model 1 Model 2   Model 3 
 
Model 4 
 
Estimate   S.E.   Estimate   S.E.   Estimate   S.E.   Estimate   S.E. 
Intercept -0.813 *** 0.1654 
 
-0.945 *** 0.1671   2.7890 *** 0.0906  2.7500 
*** 0.0923 
Impact 0.011 *** 0.0043  
0.024 *** 0.0049   0.0023  0.0024  0.0055 
** 0.0029 
Number of cited journal articles 0.003 *** 0.0007  
0.012 *** 0.0019   0.0041 *** 0.0004  0.0063 
*** 0.0011 
Patent References 0.004 *** 0.0005  
0.004 *** 0.0005   0.0028 *** 0.0003  0.0027 
*** 0.0003 
Scope 0.031 *** 0.0120  
0.032 *** 0.0120   0.1356 *** 0.0070  0.1353 
*** 0.0070 
Originality Index 0.098  
0.0940 
 
0.108 
 
0.0938   0.0493  0.0554  0.0517  0.0554 
University Collaborator -0.438 *** 0.1256  
-0.371 *** 0.1259   -0.2202 *** 0.0708  -0.2033 
*** 0.0712 
Number of Inventors 0.085 *** 0.0094  
0.085 *** 0.0094   0.0579 *** 0.0053  0.0583 
*** 0.0053 
Firm Age -0.039 *** 0.0073  
-0.039 *** 0.0073   -0.0297 *** 0.0039  -0.0294 
*** 0.0039 
Patent Age 0.008 *** 0.0007  
0.008 *** 0.0007   -0.0006 
 
0.0004  -0.0005  0.0004 
Impact * Number of journal articles         -0.001 *** 0.0002           -0.0002 ** 0.0001 
Wald Test of Firm Binary Variables 2575.00 ***     2565.00 ***     4100.385 ***     4063.27 ***   
Wald Test of Tech Class Binary Variables 74.77 *** 
  
74.80 *** 
 
  101.92 *** 
  
99.90 *** 
 
Wald Test of Full Model 5208.00 *** 
  
5236.00 *** 
 
  9877.69 *** 
  
9882.61 *** 
 AIC 29361.00 
  
 
29336.00 
  
  83175.83 
   
83172.91 
  
-2 Log Likelihood 29158.00 
  
 
29130.00 
  
  82971.83 
   
82966.91 
  
Dispersion Parameter 
   
 
   
  1.16 
   
1.16 
 
 
Multicollinearity Index 25.92 
  
 
27.07 
  
  25.92 
   
27.07 
  
Number of Observations 8486       8486       8486       8486     
*** .01 significance, ** .05 significance, * .10 significance 
Firm and technology class binary variables included in all models. 
Table 2-3.  Results of Empirical Models
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supports the view of academic science and industrial innovation as operating by 
“conflicting logics” (Sauermann and Stephan, 2013).  That is, universities, by virtue of 
their traditional concentration on basic research, appear to produce less valuable patents.  
However, high quality academic science strongly relates to higher quality innovation 
when in the hands of firms that specialize in innovation. 
What reinforces the relevance of IMPACT and JARTs is their economically 
meaningful magnitude. The average partial effect (APE)
47
 suggests that a one unit change 
in IMPACT translates to an increase in CITECOUNT of 0.007, or a 0.7% increase in the 
number of forward citations relative to the average for that year.  If we base our 
calculations on the average patent in our data base, which has 15.47 forward citations 
(see Table 2-1), one additional citation amounts to an increase of roughly 6.5%, when 
most patents in the dataset do not receive any citation. JARTs has a relatively smaller 
effect.  With an APE of 0.002, one additional JART results in a 0.2% increase in forward 
citations, compared to the year group average.  Based on our average patent, then, it 
would take 33 additional JARTs to garner one additional forward citation.  We do not 
expect that accessing and comprehending 33 journal articles to be a particularly 
cumbersome exercise for knowledge-based firms.  It follows that despite the small 
magnitude of the 0.2% figure, upon closer inspection the impact of JART is meaningful.  
                                                 
47
 The marginal effects for a Tobit model are defined by the equation 
  [    ]                
     ⁄ , where Li and Ri are the lower and upper bounds, respectively, for 
the yi. (SAS Institute, 2014).  The partial derivative on the left side of the equation is closely related to OLS 
coefficients.  To make the Tobit coefficients, β, comparable they must be adjusted by the probability factor, 
which can also be expressed as     ⁄   (Wooldridge, 2009).  After using this formula to calculate the 
marginal effect of each variable on each observation, the marginal effects of each variable are averaged 
over all observations to find the corresponding APE. 
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As it pertains to the patent-specific control variables, patents that cite more patents 
are more valuable and the same holds for patents that have a wider scope.  More 
specifically, employing the APE methodology previously introduced, expanding the 
scope of a patent by roughly four IPC categories results in one additional citation. 
Finally, more original patents did not receive more citations.  
COLLAB has a significant economically relevant partial effect on patent value.  The 
existence of a university collaborator decreases the expected number of forward citations 
by 27.1 percent
48
.  Based on our average patent, this amounts to over four forward 
citations.  In line with previous works (Czarnitzki et al., 2011), the number of inventors 
listed on a patent, representing the firm’s resources devoted to R&D, showed a 
significant positive relationship with patent value. To put the coefficient in perspective 
each additional inventor results in a little less than one additional citation. The negative 
relationship between firm age and citations indicates that younger firms tend to produce 
more valuable patents.  Finally, our results suggest that older patents, granted in earlier 
years, are more valuable and that patent value is significantly influenced by unobserved 
features of the focal firm and by the technology class the patent belongs to.   
2.5.2 Value as size of patent family 
In Model 3 of Table 2-3 we present the results of the specification with the patent 
family size as the dependent variable. Conceptually, the specification with the forward 
citations as the dependent variable addresses patent value by asking “What factors 
contribute to producing a patented innovation that market actors find valuable?”.  On the 
                                                 
48
 The APE of -0.271 is the average of the marginal effect of COLLAB on each variable, calculated as 
described in the previous footnote. 
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other hand, the specification with FAMSIZE as the dependent variable operationalizes 
patent value as it is revealed by entrepreneurial judgment and in essence addresses the 
question “What factors are relevant to the entrepreneur’s assessment of the future value 
of the patented innovation and the subsequent decision to pursue patent protection in 
multiple jurisdictions?” 
This distinction is important not only conceptually but also as a test of whether what 
we are capturing is indeed patent value. As previously discussed, Sorenson and Fleming 
(2004) discovered that patents that include journal articles as part of their prior art tend to 
receive more citations by later patents and attributed these findings to the rapid diffusion 
of knowledge that publications (as part of the prior art) bring about. Such explanation is 
indeed possible. But it should hold only for the number of forward citations measure of 
patent value and not for the patent family measure.  Accordingly, if the results from 
models that employ different dependent variables agree, then they would be in line with 
the evidence that both forward citations and patent family size measure, perhaps with 
some noise, patent value and hence strengthen our conclusions (Sneed and Johnson, 
2009; Fischer and Leidinger, 2014).    
Indeed, the findings of Model 3 are largely comparable to the findings of Model 1 and 
support our conclusion that academic science associates with more valuable industrial 
innovations from emerging knowledge-based firms.  In particular, in Model 3 science 
intensity does influence positively patent family size as a measure of patent value but this 
does not hold for the quality of science.  However, as we discuss in section 5.3 and 
present in Model 4 of Table 2-3, when we interact science intensity with science quality 
the IMPACT variable is, again, statistically significant.   
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With regards to marginal effects, because the negative binomial model is based on an 
exponential function we can interpret the Maximum Likelihood coefficients of Model 3 
as percentage changes in the dependent variable (Wooldridge, 2009).  To illustrate, one 
additional cited journal article results in a 0.4% increase in the patent family size.  If we 
again base our calculations on the average patent in our database, which has 86.77 patents 
in its family, this means that 2.9 additional JARTs would result in one additional patent 
in the patent family. 
For the remaining variables, the conclusions are in line with those of Model 1.  An 
exception is that patent age is not a significant factor in this model.  This stands to reason 
if we view the decision about international patenting, and hence family size, as a measure 
of relative value.  The number of foreign jurisdictions available for patent protection did 
not changed significantly over the time span covered by this study.  Thus if an 
entrepreneur patent owner consistently decides, for example, that his most valuable 
patents, at any given time, are worth protecting in most or all available jurisdictions while 
moderately valuable patents are only worth protecting in some subset of those 
jurisdictions, then family size for patents of a given value would not vary much over 
time.  
2.5.3 Models with interaction term 
In Models 2 and 4 of Table 2-3 we include an interaction term that is the product of 
IMPACT and JARTS.  Theoretically the two variables of primary interest in the study, 
IMPACT and JARTS, are both concerned with the same non-patent references, 
measuring different aspects of the same concept of the contribution of academic science
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Dependent Variable is year group adjusted number of forward patent citations. 
Variables 1   2   3   4   5   6 
 
Estimate   
 
Estimate   
 
Estimate   
 
Estimate   
 
Estimate   
 
Estimate   
Intercept 0.753 *** 
 
0.642 ***  -1.420 
*** 
 
-1.449 *** 
 
0.522 *** 
 
-1.618 *** 
Impact 0.010 ** 
 
0.008 *  0.014 
*** 
 
0.011 ** 
 
0.023 *** 
 
0.027 *** 
Number of cited journal articles 
 
 
 
0.005 ***  
 
 
 
0.006 *** 
 
0.015 *** 
 
0.017 *** 
Patent References 0.005 *** 
  
  0.005 
*** 
  
 
      
Scope 0.039 *** 
 
0.039 ***  0.039 
*** 
 
0.037 *** 
 
0.039 *** 
 
0.037 *** 
Originality Index 0.047  
 
0.075   0.130  
 
0.152  
 
0.079  
 
0.158 * 
University Collaborator -0.443 *** 
 
-0.542 ***  -0.353 
*** 
 
-0.478 *** 
 
-0.458 *** 
 
-0.385 *** 
Number of Inventors 0.076 *** 
 
0.084 ***  0.082 
*** 
 
0.091 *** 
 
0.084 *** 
 
0.091 *** 
Firm Age -0.099 *** 
 
-0.095 ***  
 
 
  
 
 
-0.096 *** 
   Patent Age 
 
 
  
  0.011 
*** 
 
0.010 *** 
  
 
 
0.011 *** 
Impact * Number of journal articles                         -0.001 ***   -0.001 *** 
Firm binary variables included YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
Tech class binary variables included YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
Wald Test of Firm Binary Variables 2741.00 ***   3223.10 ***   2559.20 ***   3244.80 ***   3166.80 ***   3188.30 *** 
Wald Test of Tech Class Binary Variables 70.58 *** 
 
97.58 ***  77.30 
*** 
 
114.30 *** 
 
95.10 *** 
 
111.55 *** 
Wald Test of Full Model 5052.00 *** 
 
4998.00 ***  5156.00 
*** 
 
5096.00 *** 
 
3166.80 *** 
 
3188.30 *** 
AIC 29514.00 
  
29569.00 
  
29410.00 
 
 
29470.00 
  
29535.00 
  
29430.00 
 -2 Log Likelihood 29314.00 
  
29368.00 
  
29210.00 
 
 
29270.00 
  
29332.00 
  
29228.00 
 Multicollinearity Index 14.53 
  
14.57 
  
14.22 
 
 
14.43 
  
17.22 
  
17.75 
 Number of Observations 8486     8486     8486     8486     8486     8486   
*** .01 significance, ** .05 significance, * .10 significance 
Table 2-4.  Results of Tobit Models
  
 
 
6
6
 
 
Dependent variable is patent family size. 
Variables 1   2   3   4   5   6 
 
Estimate   
 
Estimate   
 
Estimate   
 
Estimate   
 
Estimate   
 
Estimate   
Intercept 2.753 *** 
 
2.636 ***  2.387 
*** 
 
2.332 *** 
 
2.5886 *** 
 
2.2693 *** 
Impact 0.004  
 
0.002   0.005 
* 
 
0.002  
 
0.0072 ** 
 
0.0079 *** 
Number of cited journal articles 
 
 
 
0.006 ***  
 
 
 
0.006 *** 
 
0.0099 *** 
 
0.0097 *** 
Patent References 0.004 *** 
  
  0.004 
*** 
  
 
  
 
  
 
Scope 0.142 *** 
 
0.139 ***  0.145 
*** 
 
0.140 *** 
 
0.1378 *** 
 
0.1395 *** 
Originality Index 0.073  
 
0.088 
 
 0.057 
  
0.072 
  
0.0902 
  
0.0757 
 University Collaborator -0.162 ** 
 
-0.257 ***  -0.143 
** 
 
-0.237 *** 
 
-0.2252 *** 
 
-0.2058 *** 
Number of Inventors 0.057 *** 
 
0.062 ***  0.055 
*** 
 
0.060 *** 
 
0.0623 *** 
 
0.0608 *** 
Firm Age -0.025 *** 
 
-0.022 ***  
    
 
 
-0.0222 *** 
   Patent Age 
 
 
  
  0.001 
*** 
 
0.001 *** 
    
0.0010 *** 
Impact * Number of journal articles                         -0.0004 ***   -0.0004 *** 
Firm binary variables included YES   YES   YES   YES   YES   YES 
Tech class binary variables included YES   YES   YES   YES   YES   YES 
Wald Test of Firm Binary Variables 4442.64 *** 
 
4338.38 *** 
 
4112.64 *** 
 
4075.35 *** 
 
4292.32 *** 
 
4041.24 *** 
Wald Test of Technology Class Binary Variables 106.80 *** 
 
114.84 ***  122.87 
*** 
 
114.14 *** 
 
109.82 *** 
 
109.43 *** 
Wald Test of Full Model 9767.72 ***  
9775.77 *** 
 
9716.82 *** 
 
9736.28 *** 
 9790.77 
*** 
 
9750.53 *** 
AIC 83281.80 
  
83273.76 
  
83332.70 
 
 
83313.24 
  
83260.75 
  
83300.99 
 
-2 Log Likelihood 83081.80 
  
83073.76 
  
83132.70 
 
 
83113.24 
  
83058.75 
  
83098.99 
 
Dispersion Parameter 1.18 
  
1.18 
  
1.18 
 
 
1.18 
  
1.17 
  
1.18 
 
Multicollinearity Index 14.53 
  
14.57 
  
14.22 
 
 
14.43 
  
17.22 
  
17.75 
 
Number of Observations 8486     8486     8486     8486     8486     8486   
*** .01 significance, ** .05 significance, * .10 significance 
Table 2-5.  Results of Negative Binomial Models
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to industrial innovation.  On that basis we investigate the possibility that there are 
mediating effects between the two variables.  
Regardless of the dependent variable used, the interaction term is negative and 
statistically significant.  This would indicate that both the intensity of science use and the 
quality of that science are subject to diminishing returns.  For any given number of 
scientific non-patent references, increments in the quality of those references add 
progressively smaller increments to patent value, and vice versa.   
The only noticeable difference when compared to Models 1 and 3 is the increase in 
magnitude of the IMPACT and JARTs variables. All other results from these two sets of 
models are virtually unchanged from the previous models and are consonant with the 
previous analysis. 
2.6  Conclusions and discussion 
In this paper we reveal that patents of emerging life science firms that include journal 
articles in the list of references tend to be more valuable. Importantly, we find that the 
quality of those articles has a separate significant effect in raising the value of patented 
innovations. Our conclusions on the impact of academic science, as measured with 
journal articles, on the value of industrial innovations is robust to alternative proxies of 
patent value that reflect either the value ascribed by market participants or the expected 
value as assessed by the applicant firm. 
 Importantly, we argue that a prime driver of our estimates is a knowledge 
spillover mechanism under which emerging firms utilize external academic knowledge to 
improve the value of their innovations.  By extension, a main academic contribution of 
our work is to speak directly to the literature on the sources of knowledge spillovers. 
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Along the same lines, the second stream of research to which we contribute is that on the 
effects of academic science on industrial innovation.  Previous works have illustrated that 
academic science is conducive to industrial innovation and economic growth at large.  
Here we extend this body of knowledge by demonstrating that academic science serves as 
a source to improve the quality of innovation produced by emerging entrepreneurial 
firms. In a more specific academic contribution, our results may qualify to explain the 
finding that in-house academic research may lower the quality of firm innovations 
(Gittelman and Kogut, 2003).  Given our conclusions, it might be the case that these 
findings emanate from shortcomings in the division of labor within a given firm and to 
not necessarily reveal the actual value of academic research to industrial innovation.   
Testing this proposition is among the follow up works that could result from this 
paper. Others include the incorporation of science quality measures, similar to the 
IMPACT variable we construct here, in innovation studies addressing different industrial 
fields and different types of innovative organizations.  In the same vein, intensification of 
efforts by government officials and researchers to automate the process of reporting, 
identifying and utilizing scientific non-patent references (Callaert et al., 2012) could be a 
worthwhile exercise: references listed in patent documents represent a rich source of 
information for studies on innovation, knowledge exchange and the like, but the non-
standard format in which they are reported hampers their usefulness. 
For managers of high technology firms the implications of the study are 
straightforward and suggest that academic knowledge can constitute a useful input to fuel 
their innovative efforts. This is particularly important given the general resource scarcity 
that the cohort of firms we study face at their early stages and the fact that tapping into 
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academic science is relatively inexpensive.  Besides implications for managers, our study 
informs policy makers, grant funding agencies and university administrators on the 
economic effects of academic science; a topic of timely interest given the general 
decrease of public funds towards academia. 
To close we acknowledge that our study is subject to limitations.  For instance, we do 
not study the effects of academic science on different industrial fields and on different 
types of firms.  Further, due to computational difficulties we are not able to precisely 
estimate how many of the cited journal articles are co-authored by the sample firms. 
Automated search procedures could help us solve the issue and reach more refined 
estimates. However, the effectiveness of such procedures is conditional on a standardized 
reporting of cited references across patents but such reporting is not currently in place at 
the USPTO.
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3. THE INFLUENCE OF TECHNOLOGY CYCLES ON PATENT MEASURES 
 
3.1.  Introduction 
Economic studies of the innovation process can arrive at divergent conclusions based 
on how models are constructed.  To cite but one example, Johnson and Popp (2003), in a 
study of all US patents granted 1976-1996, found that more important patents, defined as 
those that were more cited by later patents, took longer to be granted than less important 
patents.  In a later study using the same measure of importance, Harhoff and Wagner 
(2009) found that more important patents were granted more quickly by the European 
Patent Office (EPO).  These results supported similar conclusions of an earlier study of 
the prescription drug approval process by the FDA (Dranove and Meltzer, 1994).  In an 
attempt the resolve this apparent paradox, Régibeau and Rockett (2010) replicated both 
sets of results by varying their empirical model.  In so doing, they demonstrated that the 
Johnson and Popp study suffered from omitted variable bias in that they did not take into 
account a patent’s position in the technology life cycle.  They found that patents earlier in 
the life cycle both took longer to be granted and earned more citations, leading to the 
spurious conclusions.  After controlling for life cycle position, they found that more 
important patents were in fact granted more quickly. 
This episode suggests that the technology life cycle may be an important, and 
heretofore largely neglected, factor in understanding the innovation process.  Régibeau 
and Rockett’s study was restricted to the technology area of genetically modified crops in 
order to concentrate on the course of one technology cycle.  If their results are shown to 
hold for other technology areas, and thus are generalizable, they will have two primary 
implications.  First, the number of forward citations is a commonly used, if somewhat 
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noisy, indicator of the market value of a patented innovation (Harhoff et al., 1999a; 
Gittelman and Kogut, 2003; Harhoff et al., 2003; Lanjouw and Schankerman, 2004a; 
Sapsalis and van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, 2007a; Gambardella et al., 2008; Czarnitzki 
et al., 2011).  Thus studies of patent value or studies that use value or forward citations as 
an explanatory variable may arrive at misleading results if they do not control for life 
cycle position.  Second, this brings up the possibility that other patent characteristics may 
vary predictably over the course of the technology life cycle, broadening the scope of 
research areas that may find it helpful to control for life cycle position. 
In this study we will examine how the value of patented innovations, as well as other 
patent characteristics, changes over the course of one technology life cycle.  We will also 
address some of the implications of these changes for future research.  In order to gain a 
clear picture of the progression of a technology life cycle we conduct our investigation 
within the context of one readily identifiable technology, that of polymerase chain 
reaction (PCR) technology.  This example offers the benefits of being a widely used 
technology with a definite, easily identifiable beginning and a reasonably long history in 
the patent record.  Our data set includes 2414 US utility patents applied for from 1985-
2008 and granted through 2012, sourced from commercial vendor Thompson Innovation.  
All information used in constructing the variables in this study is present in the 
Thompson Innovation data files. 
This study will contribute to the literature in this area by further exploring how 
technology cycle position mediates the influence of other variables that affect patent 
pendency and patent value.  We hope that our results will inform decisions regarding 
model selection in subsequent research on these topics.  This may assist future 
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investigators in avoiding the type of omitted variable bias described in the above 
example. 
We find that two different, commonly used indicators of patent value, forward 
citations and family size, vary consistently and similarly over the course of the 
technology life cycle much in the manner found by Régibeau and Rockett (2010).  We 
also find that another measurement of patent character, the originality index pioneered by 
Trajtenberg et al. (1997), does not behave as expected.  In addition, we see that changes 
in pendency time over the life cycle are somewhat more complex than envisioned by 
Régibeau and Rockett (2010), but consistent with the findings of Haupt et al. (2007) in a 
study similar to the present one.  Finally, we discover that including technology life cycle 
position in studies of patented innovations may not be universally necessary.  The rest of 
the paper proceeds as follows:  In the next section we briefly discuss the technology life 
cycle literature and its applicability to our current research.  Section 3 describes PCR 
technology and its suitability for this study.  In section 4 we report our data selection 
process and describe the data set, then move on to our descriptive findings in section 5.  
In section 6 we examine the implications of our descriptive results on an empirical 
example.  Section 7 concludes. 
3.2.  Technology Life Cycle Theory 
Innovation is one of the more visible categories of human action.  Economic actors 
are engaged in a more or less continuous process of seeking out and choosing means that 
they believe will achieve their desired ends (Mises, 1998).  As part of this process, actors 
develop new means, different in varying degrees from what has gone before.  Some of 
these inventions are substantially novel, representing what Ayres (1988) calls a 
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technological discontinuity and the beginning of a technology cycle.  In Ayres’ model the 
discontinuity provides a means of overcoming a technological barrier and opens up new 
technological opportunities.  Over time, knowledge of the discontinuity diffuses and 
actors exploit the new opportunities with incremental improvements to the original 
innovation.  Gradually innovation in the new area experiences diminishing returns as 
opportunities are realized and new constraints become binding.  At some point a new 
discontinuity solves these constraints and signals the end of the old technology cycle and 
the beginning of a new one. 
While the foregoing is an adequate conceptual outline of the technology life cycle, in 
the real world the process is much more complicated.  Innovation is always characterized 
by a great deal of uncertainty as to its ultimate market acceptance and value.  The 
constraints which constitute barriers to innovation are not only technological but also 
economic and social, and include raw material availability, production capabilities, and 
customer acceptance, among others (Kline and Rosenberg, 1986).  Indeed, Ayres (1988) 
also emphasizes that the barriers to innovation may not be located in the technology area 
where the invention originates.  The technology area that provides the context for the 
present study, polymerase chain reaction (PCR) technology, offers an example of this.  
The research that led directly to PCR (Mullis et al., 1986) was presaged by earlier work 
(Kleppe et al., 1971).  This research was no doubt plagued by the same issue that 
hampered Mullis’ initial attempts at implementing his idea – the lack of a polymerase 
enzyme that was not denatured and rendered inert by the high temperatures involved in 
the PCR process.  It was only the discovery and isolation, in the intervening years, of a 
DNA polymerase from the thermophilic bacteria Thermus aquaticus (Chien et al., 1976), 
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which came to be known as Taq polymerase, that enabled the research team to turn PCR 
from a laboratory invention into a useful innovation (Saiki et al., 1988). 
Thus the technology life cycle is characterized not only by uncertainty but also by 
change.  As the example suggests, each new discovery or innovation, whether a novel 
discontinuity or a small incremental improvement, changes the opportunities and 
incentives faced by subsequent innovators.  It is these changes that lead to the changing 
character of specific patented innovations over the course of the life cycle, which is what 
we must take into account in studies using patent data.  There are two basic, 
complementary theoretical perspectives for describing the changes that occur over a 
technology life cycle (Taylor and Taylor, 2012). 
Building on Ayres’ concept of technological discontinuity, Anderson and Tushman 
(1990) put forth a three-stage model of the technology life cycle.  The cycle begins with 
the introduction of a discontinuous innovation.  If successful, the discontinuity engenders 
a period of ferment when many variations on and improvements of the original invention 
are generated.  Out of this period of ferment comes a dominant design that becomes the 
industry standard.  The emergence of a dominant design marks the boundary between the 
period of ferment and that of incremental change.  Innovators continue to make 
incremental improvements to the dominant design until another discontinuity occurs and 
begins its own cycle.  Anderson and Tushman make a few predictions based on their 
model which they validate with historical data from glass, cement, and minicomputer 
manufacturing technology.  Among other results, they find that most new designs and 
most of the total performance improvement in the innovation occur during the period of 
ferment.  Also, they found that a dominant design is more likely to appear in a regime of 
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low appropriability of the rents that accrue to the innovation.  Taylor and Taylor term this 
the “macro view” of the technology life cycle.  They also point out that this model 
implies a shift in emphasis from innovation concerning product design (product 
innovation) during the ferment period to innovation concerning producing the product 
more efficiently (process innovation) during the period of incremental improvement. 
A somewhat more quantitative, yet complementary, perspective is represented by 
what Taylor and Taylor term the “S-curve view” of the life cycle.  This model is more 
widely used than the macro view, and with greater diversity in parameters.  Here some 
measure of patents awarded, units sold, performance improvement, or other characteristic 
is usually plotted against time, resulting in an S-shaped curve.  Generally the curve 
represents the pace of change in some sense, and in this lies the complementarity with the 
macro view.  During the introduction period immediately following the discontinuity, the 
rate of innovation is slower as knowledge of the discontinuity begins to diffuse and others 
come to understand its implications.  This corresponds to the flatter initial portion of the 
curve.  During the period of ferment the pace of change increases, corresponding to the 
steeper central portion.  As the technological opportunities come to be more fully 
exploited the cycle enters the period of incremental improvement and the pace of change 
slows again, which corresponds to the later, again flatter portion of the curve.  In this 
study we will employ concepts from both models to better understand the changes in the 
character of innovations that take place over the course of the technology life cycle. 
It is important to note here that technology life cycle models can only be descriptive 
and not predictive.  This area of study necessarily suffers from a success bias in that we 
can only study successful innovations, and generally choose to study those that are 
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considered important as well (Kline and Rosenberg, 1986).  Ayres (1988), while often 
speaking in terms of the S-curve view, emphasizes that innovation is not simply a 
function of research effort but also of exogenous technological opportunity, consisting of 
the current state of scientific knowledge and the relevant capital structure (Lachmann, 
1956).  Thus any given innovation is a historical event resulting from a unique 
constellation of factors and as such is unpredictable.   To predict the occurrence or 
progression of any given innovation cycle would entail the impossible task of gathering a 
wealth of dispersed economic, social, technological, and scientific knowledge in an 
environment of real uncertainty (Hayek, 1945). 
3.3.  Polymerase Chain Reaction Technology 
The technique of polymerase chain reaction (PCR) was developed by scientists at 
Cetus Corp. in the early and mid-1980s.  The story of its conception and development can 
be viewed as an illustration of Schumpeter’s (1942) distinction between invention and 
innovation.  The basic idea of PCR was conceived by Cetus scientist Kary Mullis in 
1983, and Mullis and Cetus applied for the first patent on this invention in 1985.  
Ultimately, the invention earned Mullis the 1993 Nobel Prize in chemistry.  Initially, 
however, few of his colleagues saw the potential of the idea (Mullis, 1990).  The first 
attempts at implementing the idea were inefficient and inaccurate.  It took another few 
years of work, including the adaptation of a special enzyme (Taq polymerase) 
instrumental to the process, by a team of Cetus scientists to bring PCR largely into the 
form we see today (Rabinow, 1996).  The innovation that PCR became is now a standard 
piece of equipment in molecular biology laboratories in a wide range of disciplines.  In 
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2002, over 3% of all articles cited in PubMed referred to PCR (Bartlett and Stirling, 
2003). 
PCR is a method of rapidly producing large quantities of DNA from an initially small 
sample.  In the PCR process the initial sample of DNA is heated, causing the two strands 
of the double helix to separate.  Also in the solution with the DNA are smaller molecules 
made of nucleotides, the same building blocks from which DNA is made, called 
oligonucleotide primers, or simply primers.  These primers are constructed so as to bind 
with specific spots in the unraveled DNA.  The solution contains two different primers 
which, when attached to the DNA strand, bracket the area to be replicated.  After the 
solution cools a bit, a special enzyme called a polymerase (hence the name) builds a 
complementary strand of DNA between the primers.  The solution is again heated, again 
separating the DNA strands.  The newly constructed DNA strands become patterns for 
new sequences, along with the original sample.  Thus with each cycle the amount of the 
target DNA sequence in the sample doubles in a sort of chain reaction (hence the rest of 
the name).  The amount of DNA produced is limited only by the amount of ingredients in 
the original solution.  This logistic progression allowed the original PCR process to 
multiply a given DNA sample a billion-fold in a matter of a few hours.  More recent 
advances in the process have cut this time to 30 minutes or less with some techniques and 
equipment. (Wittwer, 2001) 
The basic concept of PCR is quite simple and has proven to be highly adaptable.  The 
needs of the different areas of research and analysis which use PCR technology have 
given rise to a host of different techniques.  These involve differences in, for example, 
temperatures used, timing, primer design, or catalysts included in the solution. (Hayashi, 
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1994)  PCR’s simplicity and adaptability have made it somewhat of an anomaly in 
technology life cycle research in two respects.  First, since the basic technology is so 
adaptable and thus so powerful, a dominant design emerged in an environment where 
theory would not necessarily have expected.  We commonly see dominant designs in 
realms of low appropriability, where innovations are more likely to remain in the public 
domain (Anderson and Tushman, 1990).  Biotechnology, however, is generally a high 
appropriability regime; patents play an important role in maintaining these firms’ ability 
to safeguard the rewards from innovation (Ko, 1992).  In this type of environment we 
would expect to see multiple competing proprietary designs, but here we do not.  It would 
seem that the simplicity of PCR made it difficult to invent around, or at least not worth 
the trouble.  Second, the dominant design emerged very early in the life cycle.  
Conventional theory predicts that the dominant design would emerge during the growth 
phase, or period of ferment (Anderson and Tushman, 1990).  Yet with the adaptation of 
Taq polymerase (Saiki et al., 1988), the basic structure of the technology and the 
complement of ingredients were essentially standardized, this less than two years after 
the original patent was granted and before any significant adoption of the innovation by 
the scientific community.  Later innovations enhanced the speed and decreased the cost 
of the process and broadened its range of applications, as described above, but did not 
change its basic characteristics. 
These unique features of PCR make it an interesting and instructive context for 
technology life cycle research.  In addition, PCR technology has a well-defined starting 
point (Mullis, 1990; Rabinow, 1996), and represents what could be termed a significant 
competence-destroying technological discontinuity (Anderson and Tushman, 1990); 
79 
 
nothing like it had been available before.  The ensuing 23 years of patents in our dataset 
document a more or less unitary path of developing this innovation.  In the terminology 
of Taylor and Taylor (2012), for the technology application of amplifying DNA samples, 
PCR is the only extant paradigm.  For the most part, later developments have broadened 
the range of research areas using PCR rather than replacing older versions of the 
technology.  Thus we do not have several generations of PCR technology complicating 
our picture of the life cycle.  This gives us an opportunity, in a fairly simple context, to 
see how the path of development progressed in a technology that may not match the 
classic conception of a technology life cycle in all respects. 
3.4.  Data and Variables 
3.4.1 Data Selection and Description 
We began the data selection process by identifying biotechnology patents in the 
database of all US patents maintained by commercial vendor Thompson Innovation.  
Using criteria developed by OECD (2014), based on IPC codes,
49
 we collected an initial 
set of 155,985 biotechnology patents granted through 2012.  Within these, we first 
selected all patents that contained the phrase “polymerase chain reaction” in either the 
title or abstract.  This resulted in an initial sample of 2059 patents.  This retrospective 
strategy, however, was not sufficient; it did not, for example, identify the original PCR 
patent.  This presented the possibility that other significant patents had also been 
neglected and an additional, forward-looking strategy was required.  We then identified 
                                                 
49
 OECD criteria classify patents in the following IPC categories as biotechnology: A01H1/00, 
A01H4/00, A61K38/00, A61K39/00, A61K48/00, C02F3/34, C07G(11/00,13/00,15/00), C07K (4/00, 
14/00, 16/00, 17/00, 19/00), C12M, C12N, C12P, C12Q, C12S, G01N27/327, G01N33/(53*, 54*, 55*, 
57*, 68, 74, 76, 78, 88, 92). 
80 
 
the basic group of PCR patents awarded to Cetus Corp. (Carroll and Casimir, 2003).  
Research indicated that the term “polymerase chain reaction” came into common usage 
fairly early in the history of this technology, at least by 1990 (Mullis, 1990), so a very 
extensive search for missing patents did not seem to be necessary.  The original PCR 
patent was very heavily cited.  Many of the citing patents were already in our data 
sample, and others did not seem to be directly related to the main line of development of 
PCR technology.  Therefore we decided to include all patents which both cited the 
original PCR patent and were assigned the same primary 4-digit IPC code.  This resulted 
in an additional 434 patents, giving us a total data set of 2493 PCR patents.  Finally, we 
decided to eliminate patents applied for after 2008.  Given that the current median 
pendency time at the USPTO is in excess of three years (Mitra-Kahn et al., 2013), 
including issued patents applied for after 2008 would very likely result in a sample 
selection bias toward short pendency patents at the end of the sample period.  The final 
dataset includes 2414 US utility patents applied for 1985-2008 that meet our search 
criteria. 
3.4.2 Study Design 
As noted above, it is only appropriate for this study to be descriptive in nature.  Our 
first task must be to assess the overall progression to date of the PCR technology life 
cycle, to ensure that we have a more or less complete picture with all three stages 
represented.  Only then can we go on to look at how the various characteristics of 
patented innovations change over the course of that cycle and thus get an idea of how 
those changes might affect patent research.  Régibeau and Rockett (2010) held that both 
patent value, operationalized as number of forward citations, and pendency time vary 
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predictably over the technology cycle.  They found that patents earlier in the cycle were 
more foundational and thus more valuable, or at least more technologically important, in 
that they did receive more citations from later patents.  They also expected that pendency 
time would steadily decrease as the cycle progressed, due to decreasing technological 
uncertainty in the examination process as the patent office learned more about the new 
technology.  Their results were consistent with this expectation, but they did not test it 
specifically.  Haupt et al. (2007), on the other hand, expected pendency time to decrease 
during the growth phase due to learning at the patent office, but then to extend again 
during the maturity phase since “then the applications have to be compared to a higher 
technological standard” (p. 393).  They did in fact find this pattern in their sample of 
pacemaker patents, but it is not at all clear why higher standards in and of themselves 
would lead to longer pendency in a technology with which the patent office was already 
highly familiar.  We hope to shed some light on this issue. 
In order to do so, we will make greater use of a variable used by Haupt et al. (2007), 
called in that study the “immediacy of patent citations”.  This measure was developed 
earlier and termed the technology cycle time (TCT) (Kayal, 1999; Kayal and Waters, 
1999); we will use the original terminology.  TCT is defined as the average age of the 
patents cited by the focal patent and is an indicator of the pace of technological change.  
We will explain how TCT is calculated in the next section.  Haupt et al. (2007) 
demonstrated that TCT is lower (shorter cycle time) during the growth phase than in 
either the introduction or maturity phases.  Our contention is that as TCT changes over 
the course of the technology cycle some of the incentives faced by inventors and patent 
applicants change as well, impacting pendency time. 
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In addition we will examine the behavior of two other variables commonly used in 
patent studies.  First is the originality index introduced by Trajtenberg et al. (1997).  This 
index measures the degree of commonality between the technology area of the focal 
patent and those of the patents it references as prior art.  Their contention is that more 
fundamental, and thus more valuable, patents will draw on a wider technological base 
than those that are more incremental improvements.  Patents that reference patents from 
many different technology areas earn a higher score on this index, while those that draw 
on only a few areas earn lower scores.  We will explain the calculation of the index in the 
next section.  Second is patent scope, defined here as the number of different four-
character IPC codes assigned to a patent during the examination process.  Studies have 
shown that patent scope is an indicator of complexity and thereby impacts pendency time 
(Lerner, 1994b).  If either of these prove to vary regularly over the technology life cycle 
it will further reinforce the importance of taking life cycle position into account. 
3.4.3 Calculated Variables 
In this section we will describe the process by which we produced our two calculated 
variables. 
3.4.3.1 Technology Cycle Time 
As noted above, TCT is defined as the average age of all patents referenced as prior 
art by the focal patent (Kayal and Waters, 1999).  Unfortunately, nearly all the studies 
using this metric are no more explicit than that in describing how the variable is 
calculated.  For this study we explored two possibilities.  The only reasonable starting 
point for calculating this age, in our view, is the grant date of the referenced patent since 
for the bulk of the time period this is the first time the patent was published by the 
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USPTO
50
.  We initially thought that the application date of the focal patent would be the 
most reasonable ending date, but this turned out not to be the case.  In fact many, if not 
most, patents have no prior art references listed on the initial application; these are 
provided later in a document known as an Information Disclosure Statement (IDS) 
(USPTO, 2014).  Thus it is possible for a patent that is relevant to the focal patent to be 
granted and published after the focal application is filed and be listed in an IDS.  This 
results in a negative value for the age of that referenced patent and potentially for the 
TCT value for the focal patent.  The economic meaning of a negative TCT value is 
ambiguous, so we settled on another method.  Following Haupt et al. (2007) we define 
TCT as the average time between the publication date of the referenced patent and the 
publication date of the focal patent. 
The data file obtained from Thompson Innovation contained the publication dates for 
all patents, stored in date format in an Excel file.  To calculate TCT we subtracted the 
publication date of each referenced patent, in turn from the publication date of the focal 
patent, giving a measure of elapsed time in days.  This quantity was then divided by 30 to 
give an approximate age in months of the referenced patent as of the publication date of 
the focal patent.  These ages were then averaged over all referenced patents to give a 
TCT value for each focal patent.  Thus the variable is defined by the formula      
   ∑
(     )
  
 
   , for each focal patent f, where n is the number of prior art patents 
                                                 
50
 Prior to 2001, patent applications were not published prior to the patent being granted.  Beginning 1 
Jan 2001 the USPTO instituted the policy of publishing pending patent applications 18 months after the 
initial application date. 
84 
 
referenced by the focal patent, pf is the publication date of the focal patent, and pr is the 
publication date of the referenced patent. 
3.4.3.2 Originality 
To measure originality we follow Harhoff and Wagner (2009) in constructing the 
originality measure first pioneered by Trajtenberg et al. (1997).  This index is a 
Herfindahl-type measure that measures the degree of similarity between the technology 
area of the focal patent and the technology areas of the patents referenced as prior art.  
Formally, the measure is calculated as             ∑ (
      
     
)
 
  
   , where patent i 
references patents from k technology classes.  Thus Refsi is the total number of referenced 
patents for focal patent i and Refsik is the number of referenced patents from focal patent i 
that fall into technology class k. Importantly, Nk is the total number of technology areas 
represented in the list of referenced patents, not the total number of technology areas in 
the classification system.  To calculate this index we first converted the primary IPC code 
of the focal patent and all of its referenced patents to the ISI-OST-INPI classification 
system, which more accurately reflects technological relatedness than does the IPC 
coding system (Schmoch, 2008)
 51
.  Each term in the summation, then, is the number of 
patent references belonging to a particular technology class divided by the total number 
of patent references for the focal patent.  The index ranges from 0 for the least original 
patents to 1 for the most original patents. 
                                                 
51
 This classification scheme collapses a total of 550 unique four digit IPC codes into 35 technology 
classes.  This conversion was accomplished in the Excel data file by means of the vlookup function.  We 
formulated a VBA macro, available on request, to calculate the index. 
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3.5.  The PCR Technology Life Cycle 
As described above, the most common method of delineating the stages of an actual 
technology cycle is by charting the progression of subsequent innovations produced, in 
this case defined by numbers of patents.  Figure 3-1 shows the numbers of granted 
patents, grouped by the year each respective application was filed.  We use the 
application date rather than publication date here because we believe that to be a better 
measure of the time the innovation was made, without the added variable of pendency 
time.  In order to smooth the curve and chart the overall trends more clearly we also 
include the three-year moving average of the number of annual applications.  Here we see 
that PCR technology had an introductory period of some seven or eight years, during 
which there were comparatively few patents filed each year.  The growth phase lasted 
until 2002, after which the number of annual applications dropped dramatically, signaling 
entry into the maturity phase.  It appears that the innovation rate may have leveled off in 
the last three or four years of our sample.  Thus we have the full spectrum of a 
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Figure 3-1  Annual PCR-Related Patent Applications 
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technology life cycle in this sample, with good representation of each of the three phases. 
3.5.1 Patent Value 
One key portion of our study is to accurately describe how the value of patented 
innovations changes over the course of a technology cycle.  While this value is difficult 
to define, there are two common approaches to it.  Perhaps the most intuitively satisfying 
is the market value of the innovation, but this is all but impossible to measure directly.  
Many innovations are not stand alone products, but components of a larger assembly.  
The portion of the value of the final product that can be attributed to any particular 
component can only be roughly estimated.  Also, as our data consist of information on 
patents, we realize that an individual patent has a value over and above that of the 
innovation to which it is attached.  We can separate these two values conceptually, but it 
is impossible to do so empirically.  Although market value at a particular point in time 
can be measured directly in some cases (Fischer and Leidinger, 2014), generally it must 
be approached indirectly, via indicators.  Previous studies have used litigation experience 
(Harhoff et al., 2003), hypothetical sale prices (Harhoff et al., 1999a; Gambardella et al., 
2008), renewal fees (Bessen, 2008), and the size of the international patent family 
(Lanjouw and Schankerman, 2004a).  In this study we use the size of the international 
patent family, based on the reasoning that firms will only pursue patenting in multiple 
jurisdictions, with the attendant increased costs, for patents with higher expected future 
income streams. 
An alternative view of patent value might be termed technological importance.  Some 
patented innovations are more valuable than others as inputs to future innovation, 
resulting in a larger group of patent “descendants”.  Technological importance is 
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reflected in the number of prior art references received by the focal patent (forward 
citations).  This is probably the most commonly used indicator of patent value.  While 
this could conceivably operate independently from the market value of the original 
patent, it has been demonstrated to be significantly correlated with market value 
measures (Harhoff et al., 1999a; Bessen, 2008; Gambardella et al., 2008; Hegde and 
Sampat, 2009), although the relationship is quite noisy.  In this study we will also use the 
number of forward citations as an indicator of patent importance.  We see, then, that 
while market value and technological importance are conceptually separate they are in 
fact closely related. 
Régibeau and Rockett (2010) predicted that more important innovations, defined as 
those that receive more forward citations, tend to cluster around the early section of a 
technology cycle, and their results are consistent with that prediction.  They do not, 
however, make any specific assumptions or predictions regarding how importance or 
value is distributed over the cycle.  Haupt et al. (2007), on the other hand, predicts that 
patents in the introduction phase will earn more forward citations, a common indicator of 
value or importance, and those in the growth phase will earn fewer.  They make no 
prediction for the maturity phase.  We find that the PCR technology cycle displays a 
pattern consistent with the prediction of Haupt et al. (2007).  Figure 3-2 shows the 
average values of two common measures of value, forward citations and patent family 
size, for each year of the technology cycle.  We see that they are at their maximum during 
the introduction phase before declining and maintaining a relatively constant level during 
growth and maturity.  The outlier year of 2001 in the family size plot is due to one large 
family, with over 2000 members, consisting of patents related to a particular area of 
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cancer diagnosis and therapy.  Seven members of this family, having to do with PCR 
techniques, are in our data set.  In this technology cycle, then, high value patents are very 
strongly clustered in the introductory phase, consistent also with Régibeau and Rockett’s 
results.  If there are other patent characteristics that show regular variation over the 
technology cycle, the relationship between these value measures  and those 
characteristics will likely be distorted if technology life cycle position is not taken into 
account. 
Also relevant to questions of value are predictions that most of the improvements in 
quality and performance, and by extension added value, of a given technology will occur 
during the growth phase (Kline and Rosenberg, 1986; Anderson and Tushman, 1990).  As 
a rough approximation of this we summed each of our value measures for each year.  As 
Figure 3-3 shows, both forward citations and family size peak during the growth phase, 
although in different years, citations in 1997, during the early portion of the growth 
phase, and family size in the latter part, in 2001.  Although the height of the family size 
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peak is obviously affected by the outlier discussed above, the location of the peak is 
consistent with surrounding years.  This finding offers support for the contention 
regarding value added, but cannot be considered conclusive due to the nature of the 
measure.  This does illustrate, however, the importance of using multiple indicators. 
 
Figure 3-3 Annual Total Patent Value 
3.5.2 Patent Pendency 
One heavily studied patent characteristic, and a focus of the Régibeau and Rockett 
paper, is patent pendency time (Popp et al., 2004; Batabyal and Nijkamp, 2008; Harhoff 
and Wagner, 2009; Henkel and Jell, 2010; Van Zeebroeck, 2011; Xie and Giles, 2011).  
These other studies did not explore the relationship between pendency and technology 
cycle position, however.  To our knowledge Haupt et al. (2007) were the first to 
investigate this phenomenon, with Régibeau and Rockett (2010) documenting its 
importance to empirical studies.  As noted above, these two studies had divergent 
expectations as to the nature of that relationship.  Figure 3-4 shows that the PCR 
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technology life cycle shows a pattern of pendency time that is consistent with the 
expectations of Haupt et al, but that certainly does not end the discussion.  Both studies’ 
predictions about pendency time are based on patent complexity and learning at the 
patent office, so they both have a problem explaining the very short pendency of the 
earliest patents.  This may not be such a difficult question, though.  Given that 
patentability criteria are based on novelty and non-obviousness, we can surmise that it 
may be fairly easy to recognize a highly original invention, even if the patent examiner 
does not fully understand the technology at the time.  That understanding may become 
more important later on, when more patent applications related to the new technology are 
filed.  At this point finer judgments would have to be made and the learning curve at the 
patent office would become a more important factor.  A full investigation of this 
possibility is beyond the scope of the present study, but could prove informative in 
understanding patent pendency. 
 
Figure 3-4  Average Patent Pendency in Months 
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Still, as noted earlier, the explanation offered by Haupt et al. for the increasing pendency 
time later in the cycle is not very satisfying.  Part of the answer to this may be related to 
the interests of another stakeholder group in the patent process, the applicants.  Applicant 
behavior, primarily in communicating efficiently with the patent office, is a significant 
factor in pendency time, and applicants have an interest in doing what they can to ensure 
that more valuable patents are issued sooner rather than later, in the absence of other 
strategic goals, as described in the first essay of this dissertation.  In the early stages of 
the technology cycle patent examiner learning and applicant interest are working in 
concert to decrease pendency.  However, if we compare Figures 3-2 and 3-4, we see 
another explanatory challenge:  Why would the trend in pendency time reverse in a 
period when patent value is nearly constant?  The answer may lie in the changing pace of 
technological innovation.  Figure 3-5 shows how the TCT measure varies over the 
technology cycle.  The pattern is strikingly similar to that of pendency time in Figure 3-4.  
This may suggest that the explanation for the increase in pendency time during the 
maturity phase lies not with the patent office, but with the applicants.  It is likely that the 
value of a patented innovation depends not only on the characteristics of the innovation 
itself, but also on precisely when it is introduced to the market.  A firm that introduces a 
new patented product later rather than sooner loses the monopoly rents associated with 
the time the product would have been on the market, but that may not be the extent of the 
opportunity cost.  If the patent is delayed to the point that the current of innovation passes 
it by, so to speak, it may lose a much larger portion of its value.  The expected cost of 
longer pendency, then, may be higher during the growth phase than the maturity phase, 
even though the expected value of the patents may be very similar, because the pace of 
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change is faster.  Applicants who are frequent innovators, then, may tend to concentrate 
scarce time and resources toward prompt issue of patents that represent growth phase 
technologies and treat more mature technologies with less urgency.  Again, a complete 
investigation of this possibility is beyond the scope of the current study; future research 
in this area may shed light on how this factor influences pendency time.  
3.5.3 Patent Originality 
As described above, the measure of patent originality used here was initially constructed 
as an attempt to identify more fundamental, original patents.  We would expect these 
patents to occur earlier in the technology cycle, be of greater technological importance 
and hence garner more forward citations, and take longer to examine because of their 
complexity and the need for learning at the patent office (Trajtenberg et al., 1997; Gans et 
al., 2008; Harhoff and Wagner, 2009).  As Figure 3-6 shows, however, the first of these 
expectations is not borne out in this sample.  We see that the average originality score 
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steadily increases over the technology cycle, and that the most original patents, the initial 
ones, score a zero because they refer only to very few other patents, all their direct 
antecedents in this technology area.  The initial PCR patent referred to no other patents, 
and thus gets no originality score.  Later in the life cycle, as PCR had found a broad array 
of applications throughout the field of molecular biology and any given patent may be 
related to patents in a variety of areas, the average originality score increases.  The trend 
line included in the chart clearly illustrates this; a simple regression analysis showed its 
slope is significantly different from zero at a p-value of less than 0.001.  This brings up 
the possibility that this index may not be performing exactly as intended.  As the above 
cited studies, as well as the empirical illustration in the next section, shows, it does 
appear to function well as a measure of complexity, but may not be identifying truly 
original patents.  Further application of this index in the context of other technology areas 
will be necessary to provide a more complete picture of precisely what it measures. 
 
Figure 3-6  Average Patent Originality 
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3.5.4 Patent Scope 
Patent scope has been defined in various ways in different studies, including the number 
of patentable claims made (Popp et al., 2004; van Zeebroeck, 2009) and the number of 
IPC categories assigned to the patent by the patent office (Lerner, 1994b; Gans et al., 
2008).  Some papers have used both of these measures (Harhoff and Wagner, 2009; 
Henkel and Jell, 2010), while others have created and implemented more novel 
definitions (Régibeau and Rockett, 2010).  In this study we measure the scope of patent 
coverage by counting the number of four digit IPC categories assigned to each patent 
during the examination process.  In Figure 3-7 we see that patent scope does not vary in 
any regular fashion over the course of the technology life cycle; the slope of the trend line 
is essentially zero.  Thus it is likely that the effects of scope observed in studies of patent 
pendency and value are not distorted by a patent’s position in the cycle. 
 
Figure 3-7  Average Patent Scope 
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3.6.  Empirical Example 
We see, then, that the technology life cycle can be a relevant concept in 
understanding how certain characteristics of a group of related patented innovations 
change over time as their technological milieu changes.  The question remains, though, 
whether it is of practical value in ensuring valid results in empirical studies of those 
characteristics, such as pendency time or value.  Extant research on this topic is scarce 
and has obtained mixed results.  In the example described in the introduction Régibeau 
and Rockett (2010) resolved an apparent contradiction by showing that the effect of 
patent importance or value on pendency time changed sign based on whether they took 
the technology cycle into account in their analysis.  Their results appeared to support 
those of Harhoff and Wagner (2009).  However, the latter study was not restricted to a 
single technology stream and did not explicitly include technology cycle position.  Thus 
it is not at all clear that Régibeau and Rockett’s results constitute a statement about the 
nature of technology cycles in general.  Instead, it may be that they documented how the 
myriad factors influencing pendency time and value played out in the context of one 
particular technology cycle. 
In an attempt to shed some light on this issue we will build simple models, with 
commonly used variables, of patent pendency and value to see whether the influence of 
any of those variables changes when measures of technology cycle position are added to 
the model.  It is important to stress that the goal here is not to explain pendency time or 
patent value.  Rather it is to assess the impact of adding technology cycle position to a 
given model. 
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3.6.1  Patent Pendency Time 
For our model of pendency time we include many of the variables used in the first 
essay of this dissertation, including those discussed in the preceding section.  We use two 
measures of importance and value, the number of forward citations received and the size 
of the international patent family.  Use of both these measures is important because while 
they measure essentially the same patent characteristic, they do so from different 
perspectives.  We include patent scope and originality, described above, as measures of 
patent complexity.  Our expectation is that more complex patents will take longer to 
examine, as shown in the first essay.   The number of inventors can reflect firm resources 
devoted to innovation and patenting, but may also indicate complexity.  Non-patent 
references pose a special challenge to patent examiners, as their search methods are 
oriented around patent references (Popp et al., 2004).  Thus patent applications with more 
non-patent references should take more time to examine.  Finally, we include a 
technology area variable to capture unobserved heterogeneity related to the specific 
patent technology.  This is the same technology area classification scheme used in 
constructing the originality index (Schmoch, 2008).  Because the vast majority of the 
patents in this sample are in the same class, biotechnology, we used a simple binary 
variable here, coded 1 for that class and 0 for all others. 
We employ several different methods for bringing technology cycle position into the 
model.  First, we constructed a simple ordinal variable for the application year of each 
patent.  This variable ranged from 1 to 24 for the years 1985 through 2008.  As an 
alternative method, we also constructed a set of binary variable for each application year.  
In order to avoid potential convergence problems associated with very small numbers of
  
 
 
9
7
 
 
Dependent variable is patent pendency time. 
Variables 1   2   3   4   5 
 
Estimate   SE 
 
Estimate   S.E. 
 
Estimate   S.E. 
 
Estimate   SE 
 
Estimate   S.E. 
Intercept 36.642 *** 1.310  
35.045 *** 2.473 
 
53.234 *** 7.907 
 
36.259 *** 2.537 
 
51.344 *** 4.987 
Citation Count -0.021 * 0.011  
-0.019 * 0.011 
 
-0.023 ** 0.010 
 
-0.020 * 0.011 
 
-0.027 ** 0.013 
Family Size 0.001  
0.002 
 
0.001 
 
0.002 
 
-0.001 
 
0.002 
 
0.001 
 
0.002 
 
0.000 
 
0.002 
Scope 1.228 *** 0.195  
1.205 *** 0.198 
 
0.770 *** 0.205 
 
1.221 *** 0.200 
 
1.172 *** 0.199 
Originality 3.807 *** 1.265  
3.758 *** 1.267 
 
2.729 ** 1.148 
 
3.810 *** 1.264 
 
3.976 *** 1.259 
Technology Class -1.598  
0.987 
 
-1.480 
 
0.998 
 
-1.372 
 
0.917 
 
-1.581 
 
0.992 
 
-1.746 * 0.988 
Number of Inventors 0.388 ** 0.163  
0.365 ** 0.163 
 
0.142 
 
0.151 
 
0.383 ** 0.162 
 
0.385 ** 0.162 
Patent References 0.004  
0.011 
 
0.003 
 
0.011 
 
0.007 
 
0.010 
 
0.004 
 
0.011 
 
0.003 
 
0.011 
Non-patent References 0.035 *** 0.008  
0.035 *** 0.008 
 
0.034 *** 0.008 
 
0.035 *** 0.008 
 
0.035 *** 0.008 
Application Year     
0.100 
 
0.124 
            
Technology Cycle Phase             
0.175 
 
0.941 
    
Application Year Binaries   No       No       Yes       No       No   
Tech Cycle Binaries 
 
No 
   
No 
 
 
 
No 
   
No 
   
Yes 
 
Significance of Year Binaries - X2 
 
 
   
 
 
 530.98 
*** 
   
 
   
 
 
Significance of Cycle Binaries - X2 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
  
13.51 *** 
 Adjusted R2 0.060 
   
0.059 
   0.192   
 
0.059 
   
0.068 
  
Multicollinearity Condition Number 7.91 
   
15.81 
   
40.88 
  
 
17.01 
   
26.39 
  
Number of Observations 2413       2413       2413       2413       2413     
*** .01 significance, ** .05 significance, * .10 significance 
Table 3-1  Results of OLS models with robust SEs
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observations assigned to particular binary variables, we take the first five years of the 
cycle, generally containing fewer than ten patents each, as the baseline and assign 
binaries for years 1990-2008.  It is possible, though, that this degree of precision is not 
necessary.  Therefore we also divided the data up into the three recognized phases of a 
technology cycle, following the guidelines of Haupt et al. (2007).  We defined the 
introductory phase as 1985-1991, the growth phase as 1992-2002, and the maturity phase 
as 2003-2008.  As before we created both an ordinal variable and a set of binaries for this 
measure.  For the binaries we used the introductory phase as the baseline, with binaries 
for the growth and maturity phases. 
The results for this portion of the analysis are shown in Table 3-1.  Column 1 shows 
the results from the base model while columns 2 through 4 show the results when the 
different variables controlling for technology cycle position are added.  We can see that 
the results are in line with our expectations and do not change significantly when the 
control variables are added.  This is true even though we see that the binary variables for 
both application year and cycle phase are jointly significant in their respective model 
specifications.  Thus while they add some degree of explanatory power they do not affect 
the other variables.  In particular, the variable central to the case with which we began 
this essay, the number of forward citations, is very consistent across all model 
specifications.  In line with earlier findings, greater patent importance is associated with 
shorter pendency. 
As an additional check for the potential impact of cycle position we divided the 
dataset into three segments, defined by the three cycle phases, and analyzed each one 
separately.  This technique may be better suited to discovering non-linear relationships
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Dependent variable is patent pendency time. 
Variables Baseline Model   Introduction Phase   Growth Phase   Maturity Phase 
 
Estimate   SE 
 
Estimate   SE 
 
Estimate   S.E. 
 
Estimate   S.E. 
Intercept 36.642 *** 1.310  
85.385 *** 15.300 
 
35.283 *** 1.715 
 
45.348 *** 1.897 
Citation Count -0.021 * 0.011  
-0.006 
 
0.005 
 
-0.140 *** 0.016 
 
-0.486 *** 0.111 
Family Size 0.001  
0.002 
 
-0.022 
 
0.025 
 
0.005 ** 0.002 
 
-0.009 *** 0.002 
Scope 1.228 *** 0.195  
5.926 * 3.299 
 
1.852 *** 0.248 
 
-0.551 * 0.283 
Originality 3.807 *** 1.265  
25.747 
 
17.144 
 
4.323 *** 1.592 
 
3.116 * 1.881 
Technology Class -1.598  
0.987 
 
-39.830 *** 8.757 
 
-3.415 *** 1.311 
 
0.363 
 
1.345 
Number of Inventors 0.388 ** 0.163  
-1.732 
 
3.443 
 
0.511 ** 0.227 
 
0.173 
 
0.222 
Patent References 0.004  
0.011 
 
-0.125 
 
0.960 
 
0.043 
 
0.026 
 
-0.012 
 
0.010 
Non-patent References 0.035 *** 0.008  
-0.331 
 
0.222 
 
0.054 *** 0.016 
 
0.033 *** 0.007 
Adjusted R
2
 0.0595       0.1733       0.1383       0.0457     
Multicollinearity Condition Number 7.9096 
   
25.4255 
   
8.6157 
   
7.8480 
  
Number of Observations 2413       44       1579       790     
*** .01 significance, ** .05 significance, * .10 significance 
Table 3-2  Results of OLS models with robust SEs
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mediated by cycle position.  These results are in Table 3-2.  Here we see some evidence 
for technology cycle position mediating the effects of family size and patent scope.  Both 
of these are negative in the maturity phase but positive or, in the case of family size in the 
introduction phase, insignificant elsewhere.  All other variables are consistent in their 
sign, although variable in significance, across all phases. 
3.6.2 Patent Value 
We also investigated the impact of including technology cycle position on models of 
patent value, constructing sets of models for our two value measures, forward citations 
and patent family size, analogous to those in the preceding analysis of pendency.  The 
base model is similar to that used in the second essay of this dissertation, except that the 
IMPACT variable was not constructed for this dataset.  We also added the TCT variable 
to these models.  Table 3-3 shows the models concerning forward citations.  Here we see 
that not only are both sets of binary variables jointly significant in their respective 
models, as before, but the ordinal variables are significant as well.  These show that 
patent value is highest in the early stages of the technology cycle, consistent with the 
already described trend of value over the course of the cycle.  These variables have little 
effect on the signs of the other variables in the models, however.  Patent scope again 
changes sign between the base model and the models including the cycle phase variables, 
but all other variables are completely consistent.  The only other changes we see across 
the models are in significance.  Table 3-4 gives essentially the same pattern of results.  
Scope changes sign between the base model and the maturity phase, and all other 
variables only show differences in significance. 
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Dependent variable is number of forward citations received. 
Variables 1   2   3   4   5 
 
Estimate   SE 
 
Estimate   S.E. 
 
Estimate   S.E. 
 
Estimate   SE 
 
Estimate   S.E. 
Intercept 2.655 *** 0.161  
7.147 *** 0.158 
 
5.571 *** 0.332 
 
7.259 *** 0.192 
 
4.793 *** 0.274 
TCT -0.008 *** 0.001  
-0.005 *** 0.001 
 
-0.004 *** 0.001 
 
-0.003 *** 0.001 
 
-0.003 *** 0.001 
Scope -0.034 * 0.020  
0.003 
 
0.014 
 
0.012 
 
0.014 
 
0.042 ** 0.017 
 
0.042 ** 0.017 
Originality 0.527 *** 0.144  
0.908 *** 0.106 
 
0.872 *** 0.106 
 
0.599 *** 0.118 
 
0.599 *** 0.118 
Technology Class 0.455 ** 0.100  
-0.098 
 
0.072 
 
-0.124 * 0.073 
 
0.095 
 
0.084 
 
0.095 
 
0.084 
Number of Inventors 0.056 ** 0.022  
0.072 *** 0.015 
 
0.079 *** 0.015 
 
0.060 *** 0.017 
 
0.060 *** 0.018 
Patent References 0.003  
0.002 
 
0.010 *** 0.001 
 
0.010 *** 0.001 
 
0.007 *** 0.001 
 
0.007 *** 0.001 
Non-patent References -0.002 ** 0.001  
-0.002 *** 0.001 
 
-0.002 *** 0.001 
 
-0.002 ** 0.001 
 
-0.002 ** 0.001 
Application Year     
-0.341 *** 0.009 
            
Technology Cycle Phase             
-2.444 *** 0.077 
    
Application Year Binaries   No       No       Yes       No       No   
Tech Cycle Binaries 
 
No 
   
No 
 
 
 
No 
   
No 
   
Yes 
 
Significance of Year Binaries - X2 
 
 
   
 
 
 1462.61 
*** 
   
 
   
 
 
Significance of Cycle Binaries - X2 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
  
822.04 *** 
 AIC 15187.62 
   
13789.53 
   13763.01   
 
14367.59 
   
14369.58 
  
-2 Log Likelihood 15169.62 
   
13769.53 
   13707.01   
 
14347.59 
   
14347.58 
  
Dispersion Factor 3.7119    
1.8851 
   
1.8241 
  
 
2.5420 
   
2.5420 
  
Number of Observations 2413       2413       2413       2413       2413     
*** .01 significance, ** .05 significance, * .10 significance 
Table 3-3  Results of negative binomial models.
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Dependent variable is number of forward citations received 
Variables Baseline Model   Introduction Phase   Growth Phase   Maturity Phase 
 
Estimate   SE 
 
Estimate   S.E. 
 
Estimate   S.E. 
 
Estimate   SE 
Intercept 2.655 *** 0.161  
1.916 
 
1.407 
 
2.509 *** 0.147 
 
-0.321 
 
0.281 
TCT -0.008 *** 0.001  
-0.010 * 0.006 
 
0.000 
 
0.001 
 
-0.006 *** 0.001 
Scope -0.034 * 0.020  
0.037 
 
0.188 
 
0.020 
 
0.020 
 
0.064 * 0.034 
Originality 0.527 *** 0.144  
0.918 
 
0.724 
 
0.456 *** 0.138 
 
1.176 *** 0.254 
Technology Class 0.455 ** 0.100  
1.944 * 1.138 
 
0.047 
 
0.103 
 
0.055 
 
0.160 
Number of Inventors 0.056 ** 0.022  
0.522 *** 0.110 
 
-0.001 
 
0.022 
 
0.116 *** 0.034 
Patent References 0.003  
0.002 
 
0.012 
 
0.041 
 
0.008 *** 0.002 
 
0.006 *** 0.002 
Non-patent References -0.002 ** 0.001  
-0.017 * 0.009 
 
-0.003 *** 0.001 
 
-0.001 
 
0.001 
AIC 15187.62       498.40       11342.59       2473.31     
-2 Log Likelihood 15169.62 
   
480.40 
   11324.59   
 
2455.31 
  
Dispersion Factor 3.7119    
1.1029 
   
2.3711 
  
 
3.4500 
  
Number of Observations 2413       44       1579       790     
*** .01 significance, ** .05 significance, * .10 significance 
Table 3-4  Results of negative binomial models.
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Dependent variable is patent family size. 
Variables 1   2   3   4   5 
 
Estimate   SE 
 
Estimate   S.E. 
 
Estimate   S.E. 
 
Estimate   SE 
 
Estimate   S.E. 
Intercept 3.024 *** 0.101  
3.612 *** 0.146 
 
4.124 *** 0.305 
 
3.941 *** 0.156 
 
3.718 *** 0.225 
TCT -0.003 *** 0.001  
-0.002 *** 0.001 
 
-0.001 ** 0.001 
 
-0.002 *** 0.001 
 
-0.002 *** 0.001 
Scope -0.002  
0.012 
 
0.003 
 
0.012 
 
0.048 *** 0.012 
 
0.014 
 
0.012 
 
0.012 
 
0.012 
Originality 0.346 *** 0.092  
0.350 *** 0.091 
 
0.389 *** 0.090 
 
0.309 *** 0.091 
 
0.313 *** 0.091 
Technology Class 0.186 *** 0.067  
0.123 * 0.067 
 
0.005 
 
0.064 
 
0.114 * 0.066 
 
0.113 * 0.066 
Number of Inventors 0.151 *** 0.014  
0.165 *** 0.014 
 
0.138 *** 0.013 
 
0.164 *** 0.014 
 
0.162 *** 0.014 
Patent References 0.001  
0.001 
 
0.001 
 
0.001 
 
0.001 * 0.001 
 
0.001 
 
0.001 
 
0.001 
 
0.001 
Non-patent References 0.006 *** 0.001  
0.006 *** 0.001 
 
0.006 *** 0.001 
 
0.006 *** 0.001 
 
0.006 *** 0.001 
Application Year     
-0.040 *** 0.007 
            
Technology Cycle Phase             
-0.453 *** 0.059 
    
Application Year Binaries   No       No       Yes       No       No   
Tech Cycle Binaries  
No 
   
No 
   
No 
   
No 
   
Yes 
 
Significance of Year Binaries - X2         
372.31 *** 
         
Significance of Cycle Binaries - X2                 
60.27 *** 
 
AIC 22759.70 
   
22729.19 
   
22425.39 
   
22703.00 
   
22703.44 
  
-2 Log Likelihood 22741.71 
   
22709.19 
   
22369.39 
   
22683.00 
   
22681.44 
  
Dispersion Factor 1.7796 
   
1.7624 
   
1.5893 
   
1.7486 
   
1.7477 
  
Number of Observations 2413       2413       2413       2413       2413     
*** .01 significance, ** .05 significance, * .10 significance 
Table 3-5  Results of negative binomial models.
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Dependent variable is patent family size. 
Variables Baseline Model   Introduction Phase   Growth Phase   Maturity Phase 
 
Estimate   SE 
 
Estimate   S.E. 
 
Estimate   S.E. 
 
Estimate   SE 
Intercept 3.024 *** 0.101 
 
1.236 
 
1.694 
 
3.045 *** 0.134 
 
2.363 *** 0.156 
TCT -0.003 *** 0.001 
 
-0.013 
 
0.008 
 
-0.003 *** 0.001 
 
0.000 
 
0.001 
Scope -0.002 
 
0.012 
 
0.417 * 0.218 
 
-0.027 * 0.016 
 
0.089 *** 0.020 
Originality 0.346 *** 0.092 
 
0.346 
 
0.825 
 
0.238 ** 0.120 
 
0.261 * 0.145 
Technology Class 0.186 *** 0.067 
 
2.000 * 1.385 
 
0.252 *** 0.090 
 
-0.053 
 
0.092 
Number of Inventors 0.151 *** 0.014 
 
0.347 *** 0.152 
 
0.169 *** 0.019 
 
0.146 *** 0.021 
Patent References 0.001 
 
0.001 
 
-0.032 
 
0.045 
 
0.004 *** 0.002 
 
0.000 
 
0.001 
Non-patent References 0.006 *** 0.001 
 
0.009 * 0.012 
 
0.005 *** 0.001 
 
0.006 *** 0.001 
AIC 22759.70       467.36       14882.13       7286.15     
-2 Log Likelihood 22741.71 
   
449.36 
   
14864.13 
   
7268.15 
  
Dispersion Factor 1.7796 
   
1.6431 
   
1.9238 
   
1.3122 
  
Number of Observations 2413       44       1579       790     
*** .01 significance, ** .05 significance, * .10 significance 
Table 3-6  Results of negative binomial models.
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Our models with patent family size as the dependent variable, in Tables 3-5 and 3-6, 
show similar results.  Again the binary variables are jointly significant in their respective 
models, as are the ordinal variables.  The results indicate that higher value patents occur 
early in the technology cycle, as before.  In this set of models no variables show a sign 
change between the base model and the specifications that include cycle position, 
although significance does change for some.  Again patent scope shows greater changes 
across models than other variables. 
3.7.  Conclusion 
In this study we set out with a twofold mission:  First, we described various aspects of 
the life cycle of a well-known and well-defined technology, that of the polymerase chain 
reaction.  Our results in this area agree in large part with those obtained in earlier studies, 
particularly those of Haupt et al. (2007) and Kayal and Waters (1999).  We found that 
measures of patent value, patent pendency time, and technology cycle time all vary in 
predictable ways over the course of this life cycle.  These results provide a more 
extensive empirical explanation of Régibeau and Rockett’s (2010) resolution of the 
controversy described in the introduction.  They also lend support to the contention of 
Haupt et al. and Kayal (1999) that these indicators may be helpful in discerning the 
current state of an ongoing technology life cycle. 
Second, we set out to evaluate the implications of the variations we documented on 
research concerning patented innovations.  Our findings in this section suggest that the 
impact of including technology cycle position in studies of the economics of patented 
innovations may be contingent upon the idiosyncrasies of a particular technology life 
cycle and the details of the model used.   In the case of PCR technology, the earliest, 
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higher value patents were approved fairly quickly, contrary to the assumptions of 
Régibeau and Rockett (2010).  As noted earlier, this was presumably because of two 
factors.  First, the very high expected value of the basic patents gave the applicant, Cetus 
Corp., a strong incentive to do what it could to expedite the process.  Although the initial 
reaction to the invention was cool, this value quickly became apparent.  In fact, Cetus 
entered into two PCR-related joint venture agreements while the patent was still pending 
and ultimately sold the technology to Hoffman-LaRoche in 1991 for a reported $300 
million (Rabinow, 1996).  Second, PCR was novel in the extreme, a dramatic 
technological discontinuity.  It is possible that patent office examiners could recognize its 
patentability even though they may not have fully understood the technology or its 
implications.  It may have been only later, when presented with follow-on patents, that 
the learning curve described by Régibeau and Rockett brought about temporarily longer 
pendency times.  This possibility could go a long way in explaining the differences in the 
results obtained here, by Régibeau and Rockett (2010), and by Harhoff and Wagner 
(2009). 
In a larger sense, this study lends support to the contention that any given technology 
life cycle is a historical process resulting from a unique constellation of economic, social, 
technological, and scientific factors, many of which may be unobservable.  In the first 
two essays of this dissertation we attempted to construct models that were as 
comprehensive as possible and firmly grounded in the principles of human action.  This 
is, of course, prudent in any area of research.  These results suggest that adding 
technology life cycle position to such a model may or may not be a needed proxy for 
further, unobserved factors, depending on the characteristics of the particular cycle in 
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question.  It appears that the value of technology cycle position in such a model may be 
an empirical rather than a theoretical question. 
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